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Abstract 
 
With urbanization and growing human population, water demand is constantly on the rise. Due to 
limited water resources, providing access to fresh potable water to the rising needs is challenging. 
Water distribution systems are the main arteries that supply fresh water to all the house-holds, offices 
and industries. Various factors such as excessive water pressure, aging or environmental 
disturbances, e.g., from road traffic, can all contribute to damage of water distribution pipelines and 
can result in leaks in water distribution networks (WDN). This could in turn result in financial loss 
and could pose additional challenges in providing potable water to the entire community, sometimes 
even leading to contaminant intrusion. Traditional leak detection methods such as visual inspections 
can detect leaks; however, this method is reactive in nature and can result in potentially losing large 
amounts of water before intervention strategies can be employed. On the other hand, hardware-based 
inspection techniques can accurately detect leaks, but are labor intensive, time consuming, expensive 
and effective only for short distances. Some existing software techniques are less expensive; 
however, their effectiveness depends on the accuracy of data collected and operating conditions. 
Modern existing leak detection techniques based on Internet of Things (IoT)—consisting of data 
collection sensor sub system, internet connectivity and a decision making sub system—alleviate 
many issues associated with hardware and software methods, however they are considered to scale 
poorly and face security issues, fault tolerance issues, interoperability issues, insufficient storage and 
processing abilities to store and process large quantities of real time data captured by the sensor sub 
systems. As a potential solution to these issues, this thesis deals with the application of a cloud-based 
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leak detection system within the overarching concept of IoT. A detailed design and implementation 
of Google Cloud Platform (GCP) which can provide scalable, secure data processing system to 
analyze both real-time and batch data collected from IoT devices monitoring a WDN is presented. 
To circumvent the issue of access to a live WDN, the proposed system uses emulators, python Hyper 
Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) client running on a computer and a python HTTP client running on 
an IoT device (Raspberry Pi 3) to simulate live streams of acoustic pressure data from hydrophone 
sensors. Since the data itself was collected from a live WDN, the decision-making subsystem mimics 
results expected from live WDN data. The data ingestion layer on GCP incorporates two types of 
authentication: OAuth2.0 authentication and Application Program Interface (API) key authentication 
along with other GCP components using service account features to ensure end-to-end secure data 
processing. Decision support sub-system includes simple, yet powerful algorithm, namely the one 
class support vector machine (OCSVM) with non-linear radial basis function (RBF) kernel. It is 
shown in this thesis that GCP provides a scalable and fault tolerant infrastructure at every stage of 
data life cycle such as data ingestion, storage, processing and results visualization. The 
implementation in this thesis demonstrates the applicability of the leak detection IoT framework and 
the concept of a cloud based IoT solution for leak detection in WDN, which is the first demonstration 
of its kind to the author’s knowledge. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Water is an integral part of human life. Only 3% of water on earth is fresh water and is not readily 
available for human use as most of it is trapped in glaciers and polar ice caps or under-ground and 
only a small portion of it is available above the ground or in the air (Wu, Z.Y. et al., 2011). 
Consequently, water needs to be accessed from underground or surface water sources and pumped 
to treatment plants, treated, stored and distributed based on demand. Due to rapid increase in human 
population and urbanization, water demand has increased tremendously, placing a lot of pressure on 
reducing or eliminating water wastage. Water distribution networks (WDNs) are the main arteries 
used to transport treated water from water sources to treatment plants, and from treatment plants to 
homes, industries and offices.  In most WDNs, a large amount of water is lost in transit from 
treatment plant to the consumers; the amount of water lost is estimated to be 20-30 percent between 
treatment and delivery and in older WDNs this may be as much as 50 percent (Hunaidi, O. et al., 
2000).  
 
Water loss can be due to pipe flushing, metering errors, leakage or theft. Leakage is one of the major 
causes of water loss (Hunaidi, O. et al., 2000). Leakage can occur in different parts of the distribution 
system such as service connection pipes, joints, valves, transmission pipes, distribution pipes and 
fire hydrants. Several factors including wear and tear due to aging of pipeline infrastructure, 
excessive loads and vibration from road traffic, natural disasters, vandalism, excessive water 
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pressure, material defects, corrosion, faulty installation and ground movement due to extreme 
weather condition can all contribute to leaks in WDNs. Leaks not only result in wastage and non-
revenue water but could also pose health risks as proximal sewage water could intrude into water 
mains under vacuum conditions resulting from large main breaks. Small leaks could lead to damage 
in the pipe network, e.g. erosion of pipe bedding, leading to bursts, pipe breaks and eventually 
damage to the foundations of roads and buildings (e.g., Figure 1.1). All of these negative 
consequences are forcing municipalities and infrastructure owners to reconsider conventional leak 
detection methods, which are mainly visual in nature, and implement robust technology-driven 
leakage monitoring and control technologies. 
 
Figure 1.1 Water burst resulting in damage to a road [1] 
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1.2 Long-term monitoring for leaks using an IoT framework 
Traditional leak detection methods are manual, visual, reactive, and allow failures in pipes to occur 
before intervention, which is not an optimal maintenance strategy. Furthermore, manual inspection 
of the entire WDN for signs of leak(s) is labour intensive. As well, many leaks do not surface at all, 
which results in a low detection rate. Hence, there is a pressing need for a monitoring system which 
can continuously monitor WDNs to detect leaks as soon as they occur so that intervention strategies 
can be put in place. Leaks can be detected by monitoring various parameters such as water pressure, 
acoustic pressure, soil properties of surrounding soil along pipelines, temperature of surrounding soil 
and amount of water that flows across a given point along the pipeline. In most cases, sensors need 
to be deployed within the pipeline which provide a direct means to monitor a WDN system in order 
to gain insights regarding their condition. Traditionally, deploying dense sensor networks have been 
associated with large sensor hardware costs and software complexity. However, with the recent 
advances in micromachinery and semiconductors, sensors, microcontrollers and single board 
computers have matured in terms of power consumption, storage capacity and processing ability, 
while becoming cheaper at the same time. This has opened up the possibility to deploy relatively 
inexpensive dense sensor networks within reach of many cities and municipalities. Such dense 
networks form the basis for what is commonly known as Internet of Things (IoT).  
Although modern microcontrollers/single board computers have advanced significantly in terms of 
their capabilities, the high data acquisition rates from sensors (pressure sensors and hydrophones) 
deployed for leak detection introduce several challenges in terms of power management, storage, 
processing and transmission of large amounts of data. Some of the existing leak detection techniques 
use data in its raw form (Whittle, A. J. et al., 2013). Processing data in its raw form is not efficient 
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and scales poorly. Some leak detection techniques (Karray, F. et al., 2016) run leak detection 
algorithm on sensor/edge nodes, however running complex algorithms on edge devices is not power 
efficient. To overcome this, lossy compression techniques (Feng, N. 2019) such as extracting features 
from raw data, (while retaining key leak related information), can be employed at the sensor nodes 
to transmit only the results to remote servers with large storage and processing capacities, while 
discarding raw data. This is in general the preferred alternative to transmitting all the raw data and 
storing and processing at a remote centralized location. 
As cities grow, WDNs need to expand and so do sensor networks. Traditional sensor networks often 
have one or two central processing computer systems which process the data collected from all the 
nodes (Adedeji, K. et al., 2016). Such an architecture is not scalable and does not possess sufficient 
redundancy. To overcome these issues, distributed systems are needed which provide good fault 
tolerance with abundant processing and storage capabilities. More recently, commercial vendors, 
called cloud service providers, have started to provision and maintain multiple computers and 
software resources to provide data processing and storage services, which are subscription based. 
Such cloud services also provide ready access to user friendly data analyzing tools such as signal 
processing or machine learning tools, without the need to build such applications from scratch. Some 
studies have investigated cloud based leak detection solutions (Arangoa, I. M. et al, 2014), however, 
they lack the description of key design and implementation aspects and hence outside the reach of 
current academic community interested in this application. 
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1.3 Objective 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the design and implementation of an auto-
scalable cloud based system that can achieve reliable leak detection in WDNs in both real time and 
in batch. This thesis aims to demonstrate this technology using actual acoustic data captured from a 
live WDN in Southern Ontario and state-of-the-art classification tools available in a leading cloud 
services platform. 
1.4 Organization 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews existing leak detection methods, their advantages, drawbacks, and provides basic 
information about the system proposed in this thesis which can overcome some of the main 
drawbacks identified in existing solutions. 
Chapter 3 provides the details of the software architecture which is used in this thesis. It also 
introduces the basic concepts of the cloud platform which is used to develop the leak detection 
framework for WDNs.  
Chapter 4 describes the details of data collection, feature extraction, data analysis and results of a 
powerful classification algorithm which is employed in this thesis to detect leaks. The 
implementation details of emulators and cloud platform components used in the architecture are 
provided in Appendix A. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing major findings in this research and proposes ideas 
for future research. 
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Chapter 2   Background and Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, traditional leak detection techniques in the literature are reviewed and their 
advantages and limitations are discussed within the context of the overarching objective of this thesis. 
State of the art tools based on IoT, their advantages, disadvantages, existing cloud-based solutions 
and their limitations are also discussed. This chapter will then set the stage for the motivation and 
the stated contributions of this thesis. 
 
2.1 Traditional leak detection methods and limitations 
Pipelines are the most economical way of transporting water from one place to another. Older 
distribution pipelines are typically made of asbestos cement or cast-iron material. More recently, 
they have been made of poly vinyl chloride (PVC), polyethylene or ductile iron material. Regardless 
of the material used, these pipelines are designed and constructed to last for several decades with 
many well past their intended service life. Additionally, many factors such as material defects, 
corrosion, excessive water pressure, ground movement due to freezing or drought, excessive 
vibration caused by traffic loads can all result in pre-mature failure of these pipes. Though pipelines 
made of ductile material (such as copper pipes) resist cracking, pinhole-sized leaks (shown in Figure 
2.1) can occur in them which grow slowly over time. In pipes made of less ductile materials such as 
cast iron and asbestos cement, crack-like (cracks are shown in Figure 2.2) leaks occur in episodes 
with each episode separated by days, months or even years. Both pinhole leaks and cracking leaks 
over a period of time may progress to complete failure of the pipeline structure and could eventually 
lead to bursts. In order to detect leaks before they progress into larger bursts, numerous techniques 
have been developed and discussed in the literature [cive700, 2018]. A formal classification method 
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is not available; hence they are discussed from the standpoint of the core technology used in these 
methods, which is summarized next. 
 
Figure 2.1 Example of a pinhole leak [2]. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Example of a cracks in the pipes which can result in large leaks [3]. 
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2.1.1 Reactive and proactive methods 
At a very basic level of classification, leak detection techniques can be reactive or proactive. As the 
name implies, in the reactive approach leaks are detected either through eye-witness notifications or 
customer complaints. This is not a formal leak management strategy and can easily lead to water loss 
of up to 40% (Puust, R. et al., 2010, Ramos, H. et al., 2001) and it presents inevitable problems for 
customers. Proactive approach is meant to be preventive in nature and it involves frequent monitoring 
of pipelines for anomalies, which are indicative of leaks. Detecting anomalies and repairing small 
leaks early prevent progressive catastrophic damage. The literature review in this chapter focuses on 
proactive techniques and are grouped according to the core technology being utilized for detecting 
leaks and anomalies in each case. 
 
2.1.2 Hardware and software methods 
Leak detection methods can be hardware based or software based. Hardware based methods employ 
appropriate equipment such as listening rods, leak correlators and leak noise loggers to detect leaks. 
Some sub categories of hardware based techniques are acoustic leak detection (Kim, M. et al., 2009), 
fibre optic sensors (Tapanes, E., 2001), pigging (Furness, RA. et al., 2009), vapor or liquid sensing 
tubes (Geiger, G. et al., 2006), liquid sensing cables (Geiger, G. et al., 2006) and soil monitoring 
(Lowry, W.E. et al., 2000). Hardware based techniques have shown to exhibit good sensitivity to 
leaks and are quite accurate in finding leak locations. However, they are expensive and their 
installation can be very complex and time consuming. Leak detection using such techniques is 
limited to relatively short distances. Hence, they are used more for inspections as required (when a 
leak is known to have occurred or discovered during leak surveys) rather than for long-term 
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monitoring when the presence or absence of leaks are unknown to begin with. Software based 
techniques involve monitoring internal pipeline parameters such as pressure, flow and temperature 
with or without the aid of sensors. Various sub-categories of software based techniques to detect 
leaks are: digital signal processing (US Department of Transportation, 2007), real time transient 
modelling (Hauge, E. et al., 2007, Carbó-Bech, A. et al., 2017), statistical approaches (Zhang, J. et 
al., 1998), negative pressure waves (Mpesha, W. et al., 2001), mass-volume balancing (Liu, J. et al., 
2008), to name a few. Based on a multitude of implementations used in the literature using the above 
subcategories of software based techniques, it is safe to conclude that software techniques are less 
expensive compared to their hardware counterparts. However, their effectiveness depends on the 
accuracy of collected data, operating conditions and system characteristics (Golmohamadi, M., 2015, 
Gamboa-Medina, M.M. et al., 2014). Despite an enormous activity in this area, there has not been a 
consensus regarding the best method or class of methods to be used for leak monitoring or detection. 
 
2.1.3 Visual, hydraulic and acoustic methods 
Yet another way to categorize leak detection techniques is, for example, based on whether they rely 
on visual, hydraulic or acoustic characterization of the WDNs. 
Visual Inspection 
Some of the visual inspection methods available are laser scans, satellite based methods, ground 
penetrating radar (Eyuboglu, S. et al., 2003, Ayala–Cabrera, A. et al. 2013, Abouhamad, M. et al., 
2016) and infrared thermal camera based methods. The effectiveness of visual inspection methods is 
relatively less established compared to hydraulic and acoustic methods and hence is not discussed in 
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detail here. Infrared thermal camera-based inspection can detect and locate leaks in pipelines buried 
as deep as 30 meters below ground surface (Weil, G.J. 1993, Jackson, C.N., et al. 1998). Modern 
satellite-based methods use images taken from satellites to perform complex analysis for possible 
signs of leaks. Such techniques are convenient, cost and time effective. However, the limitation of 
this method is spatial resolution; high image resolution is necessary to identify the leaks as leaks 
generally occur in small regions along the pipe (Hadjimitsis, D.G. et al., 2010; A. Agapiou et al., 
2014). Ground penetrating radars locate leaks in water pipes by detecting underground voids created 
around the pipes near the leak locations by leaking water. These voids are easily formed in sandy 
soils whereas in the soft clay soil such voids are not easily formed and is difficult to detect using 
radar (Hunaidi, O. et al., 2000). In laser technology, fibre-optic cables are installed along the length 
of the pipeline. When a leak occurs, water comes in contact with the fibre-optic cable changing its 
temperature and thus changing the optical response of the laser beam pulse passing through the cable, 
indicating a leak (Geiger, G. et al., 2003, Großwig, S. et al., 2001). This technique works only if the 
water is at a temperature different from that of fibre-optic cable, not otherwise.  
Hydraulic approach 
In the hydraulic approach, pressure, flow, and transient pressure are used to detect leaks as leak 
information is known to manifest in these parameters which can be measured relatively easily within 
the WDN, either locally at the pipe level or globally at the network level. Subcategories of this type 
are district metered areas (DMAs), pressure and flow based burst detection, and transient pressure 
based techniques.  
(a) DMAs: DMAs are discrete areas of WDN which are created by closing boundary valves 
which can be opened if more water needs to supplied to the area and hence remain flexible for 
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changing demands. DMAs can also be created by permanently disconnecting two areas within 
the WDN. In DMAs, water flowing in and out of DMAs are monitored by using meters 
(Lambert, A., 1994, MacDonald, G. 2005). Due to the incompressible nature of water, flow 
meter reading at the DMA level can indicate loss of water and is effective in detecting the rate 
of rise of leakage. Limitation of this method is that there can be flow meter error which is usually 
around +/-5%, so only those flows larger than this error can be detected using this technology. 
(b) Burst detection: A sudden, high volume outflow of water from a single point in the network 
is called a burst which can be detected directly through pressure and flow monitoring, both of 
which are hydraulic parameters. Such events however, are usually reported by the public. Zan, 
T. et al., 2014 demonstrated that large leaks are associated with pressure transients and can be 
detected using pressure sensors. Wu, Y. et al., 2017, Mounce, S.R. et al., 2011 and Kim, Y. et 
al., 2016 discussed techniques to detect bursts using a data driven framework. Since bursts result 
in heavy loss of water, its immediate detection and shut off of water can be highly valuable 
(Lambert, A., 1994).  
(c) Transient based leak detection: In transient based leak detection approach, small but sudden 
changes in the pipeline pressure caused due to changes in the pipe wall such as a crack or a hole 
is captured by monitoring pressure (Pudar, R.S. et al., 1992, Kapelan, Z.S. et al., 2003, Kapelan, 
Z.S. et al., 2002, Colombo, A.F. et al., 2009). There are pressure (hydraulic) transients and 
acoustic transients, both of which could be caused by cracking events, but tend to be small and 
difficult to detect. So, sophisticated signal processing and artificial intelligence (AI) techniques 
may be needed to detect them (Vitkovsky, J., et al., 2000). Since small leaks cause negligible 
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transients, detection of pinhole leaks is difficult using conventional transient detection 
techniques. 
(d) Induced transient reflection: Unlike passive transients monitored due to sudden changes 
in the pipe conditions, induced transient reflection requires creation of pressure transient, e.g., 
by a sudden closure of a valve (or, using a solenoid valve). This is an active method, where 
reflections of the active transient waves captured by sensors are used to identify the presence of 
a leak (Wang, X.J. et al., 2002, Karney, B. et al., 2009, Pothof, I. et al., 2012, Feng, N. 2019). 
Any change in the physical structure of the pipe such as a crack or a hole causes wave reflection, 
thus altering system’s flow and pressure response. The transient signal from a leaking pipeline 
exhibits a distinct singularity not present in intact pipes. The transient signal in the leaking 
system decays (Nixon, W. et al., 2006) more rapidly compared to that in the intact system. The 
properties of reflected signal and the measure of decay of transient signal at a measuring location 
are used to identify the presence of leak in the pipelines (Colombo, A.F. et al., 2009). Transients 
can introduce disturbances into the pipelines and cause the pipelines to rupture. So, measures 
need to be taken to ensure that the transients generated are safe transient and do not by 
themselves result in compromising the pipe structure integrity. Some devices that provide 
protection from water surges are surge tank (open), surge vessel (air chamber, closed surge tank, 
bladder tank and hybrid tank), feed tank, surge anticipation valve, pressure relief valve, air 
release/vacuum valve and pump bypass line. The general principle behind the functioning of 
such devices is to store water or otherwise delay the change in flow rate or to discharge water 
from the pipeline (Boulos, P. F. et al., 2005). Though induced transient reflection method helps 
to identify leaks, it is not very popular as it requires active generation of transients. 
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Acoustic approaches 
Acoustic approaches are by far the most prevalent leak detection methods in use today. The 
subcategories of this method are: inline acoustics, ground sounding, sounding at fittings and 
correlation methods. 
(a) Inline acoustics: In the inline acoustic method, acoustic sensors such as hydrophones or 
encased accelerometers are inserted into pipes.  In Chang, Y.C. et al., 2009 (PipeProbe project), 
the authors proposed a tiny capsule of a waterproof mobile sensor system consisting of EcoMote 
with a built-in accelerometer and a pressure sensor (MS5541C from Intersema). This capsule is 
dropped into the pipeline at one end, which then traverses the length of the pipe and stores 
pressure measurements on an on-board flash memory, which is then subsequently retrieved 
manually and analysed in the laboratory. This method is intrusive and needs a lot of supervision. 
SmartBall, a commercially available system (Pure technologies) consists of a range of acoustic 
sensors, accelerometer, magnetometer, ultrasonic transmitter and temperature sensor. It travels 
along the pipe when the water flows, collects acoustic data, detects and locates the leak. 
Similarly, Seto, L. et al., 2013 proposed the idea of a small ball embedded with an acoustic 
sensor, temperature, and a pressure sensor inserted into a pipe and the data is collected and 
analyzed for any anomalies inside the pipe. While this technique is promising for inspections 
where a leak is known to occur, it can be quite intrusive and expensive to deploy on a large scale 
when the approximate leak location is unknown.  
(b) Sounding at fittings: Depending on the size and type of the pipe, leak sound/vibrations are 
transmitted either through the pipe wall or through the water column over long distances. This 
is especially true for the case of metal pipes and not as much for plastics. Such mechanical 
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vibrations produced by water leaking from pressurized pipes can be detected by the sensors and 
acoustic devices at various convenient-to-access locations in the network. Sounding at fittings 
involves placing sensors at fittings such as service connections, fire hydrants or isolation valves 
and listening for leaks (Hunaidi, O. et al., 2004, Pal et al., 2010). Loggers equipped with remote 
communication capabilities then record and transmit the sound file or features extracted from 
such sound files to monitoring centres for processing. This method is popular as it generally 
utilizes existing access points in the distribution network for monitoring and does not require 
major construction or modification to the existing pipe network. 
(c)  Ground sounding: This method involves placing a ground microphone at the suspected leak 
location. Initially, the presence of leak is identified, by listening to leak sounds from fire 
hydrants/valves. It is then localized, by listening directly above the pipe, on the ground surface, 
at close intervals of about 1 meter. This process is time consuming and useful only to localize 
the leak, if the leak is already detected (Hunaidi, O. et al., 2004). 
(d) Leak correlators: In the correlation method, acoustic sensors are placed at fittings separated 
by a fixed and known distance. Time synchronized signals (from two hydrophones or 
accelerometers) are transmitted from the sensors to a central device. The signals are then cross-
correlated and the leak is localized using the known acoustic speed in a pipe and the lag 
corresponding to the peak in the cross-correlation.  Correlation methods have been found to 
perform well and are more accurate compared to listening devices (Choi, J. et al., 2017, Zhang, 
L. et al., 2013, Hunaidi, O. et al., 2004, M. Pal et al., 2010). Compared to accelerometers, 
hydrophones have been shown to be less susceptible to environmental noise and better tuned to 
low frequency sounds compared to accelerometers. However, in the correlation-based methods, 
 15 
 
isolating leak induced noise, which tends to be small compared to other environmental noise 
factors such as pumps, still remains a major challenge. 
 
2.1.4 Non-acoustic methods 
Other non acoustic leak detection methods are also available, which do not fit into the general 
classifications described previously. They are: tracer gas (Lowry, W.E. et al., 2000), electromagnetic 
methods (Liu, Z. et al., 2013) to name a few. Their use is limited and their effectiveness is relatively 
less established compared to acoustic methods and hence are not discussed in detail here.  
 
2.1.5 SCADA approaches  
Traditional SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems have also been considered to 
mine for leak related data at a system level. In this schema, permanent flow meters from various 
points in the WDN telemetrically send data to the SCADA system for analysis, e.g., flow rate data, 
which can then be analysed for anomalies by mining this SCADA information (Mounce, S.R. et al., 
2007). Although such an approach can provide near real time monitoring information, most SCADA 
systems in use today generally collect information from pumping stations, water tanks or reservoirs, 
which do not allow for local monitoring and can only be used for large bursts and are associated with 
large initial deployment cost (Cheung, P. et al., 2014). Interoperability is another issue within this 
method; devices manufactured from different vendors, or different versions of devices from same 
vendor often present challenges in being able to work together. Scalability is another issue; due to 
its traditional architecture, SCADA performance degrades with an increase in the number of users. 
Furthermore, SCADA systems are designed mainly to run the day-to-day operations and so it can 
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ingest and store only a finite amount of data. SCADA systems tie together decentralized subsystems 
which makes security a major threat (Gao, J. et al., 2013).  
With the introduction of IoT technology, many of the issues described previously are addressed by 
augmenting SCADA systems with IoT. SCADA can still act as one of the data sources (Romano, M. 
et al., 2013), while IoT focuses on analyzing the granular machine data. Details about IoT technology 
and other IoT based leak detection systems present in literature are discussed next. 
 
2.2 State-of-the-art monitoring technologies 
With the exception of very few, a majority of the technologies discussed previously can be regarded 
as inspection methods and cannot be easily scaled to monitor large WDNs. With the advent of IoT 
and the back-end cloud technology, recent trends have demonstrated the use of such tools for leak 
detection in long-term monitoring situations. This section discusses some modern leak monitoring 
systems in WDNs, their advantages and their limitations and then concludes with a summary of 
major gaps and a road map to address key limitations in current technology.  
 
2.2.1 IoT 
IoT, which is a hardware and software based pro-active technique, has been explored as a framework 
in modern leak detection systems to a limited extent. In simple terms, IoT can be viewed as a network 
of physical devices or “things” embedded with sensors, software and connectivity which enable those 
things to connect, collect, and exchange data (Anzelmo, E. et al., 2011, Barnaghi, P. et al., 2012). 
IoT extends internet connectivity beyond standard devices such as laptops, desktops, smartphones 
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and tablets to everyday objects which were traditionally considered “dumb”. IoT enables things or 
systems to be observed and understood using measured data. As these things are embedded with 
sensors, they can collect data and by analyzing such data an organization or an individual can make 
informed decisions and benefit from timely decisions or interventions. This concept also supports 
the overarching theme of Smart Infrastructure, where IoT devices and decision support systems can 
help manage deteriorating infrastructure such as WDNs. The basic IoT concept is described in Figure 
2.3 and consists of three components: sensor and data acquisition system, network connectivity and 
data processing and decision making layer. WDN when integrated with these three components can 
be envisioned as a smart water distribution system, or an IoT system.  
 
Figure 2.3 Three components comprising the IoT 
 
More details about the three components namely, sensor and data acquisition system, network 
connectivity and data processing and decision making layer are discussed in the following sub-
sections. The discussion is limited to IoT applications involving water pipes and distribution systems 
in order to keep the literature review both pertinent to this thesis and manageable.  
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Sensor nodes 
A network of sensor nodes is at the heart of any IoT based leak detection solution. A sensor node 
typically consists of sensor(s), a microcontroller/microcomputer and a power source. There is no 
accepted standard for the type of sensors to be used in leak detection application and a variety of 
sensors and micro-controllers have been employed for this purpose. For example, Christodoulou, S. 
et al. 2010 used sensor nodes comprising of a Mica 433MHz mote data acquisition system placed in 
a waterproof package and a Decagon Ech2o dielectric sensor for soil volumetric water content (soil 
moisture) measurements. Water flow was measured using KENT V100 meters and Zonescan-800 
leak noise logger was used for leak noise detection. Mohamed, N. et al., 2011 proposed acoustic 
wireless sensor nodes with an acoustic transceiver, a processor, a battery, a memory, and small 
storage at each sensor node. AL-Kadi, T. et al., 2013 used two layers of sensors: a hub layer and an 
in-soil layer sensor. The hub layer was deployed inside the pipeline and consisted of pressure sensors 
and acoustic sensors. The soil layer was deployed outside the pipeline and consisted of sensors that 
could measure soil properties such as moisture and temperature. These measurements were sent to a 
head cluster located at the pump station where the data was processed and sent to a remote 
administration centre. Whittle et al. 2013 used a wireless sensor node with hydrophone and pressure 
sensors, a 72MHz ARM Cortex M3 CPU with 64KB of RAM, a 2GB SD card for storage, a GPS 
with pulse-per-second functionality for time synchronization and a 33Ah 12 V battery. Adedeji, K. 
et al., 2016 employed a pressure sensor, an Arduino microcontroller, a battery and a flash memory 
in the sensor node. Kartakis, S. et al., 2016 used four nodes with an Intel Galileo board and an 
ethernet module, two nodes with an Intel Edison board with WiFi connectivity. Along with these, a 
smart water sensor board consisting of a flow meter, a pressure sensor and a motorized valve were 
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used. Karray, F. et al., 2016, proposed a wireless IoT solution (EARNPIPE), where each sensor node 
consists of an ARM processor, a Kalman filter accelerator, a sensor interface, ADC, memory, a radio 
transceiver and a power management unit. Stoianov, I. et al., 2007 used a sensor node consisting of 
an Intel Mote with ARM7 core, 64kB RAM, 512kB flash and a Bluetooth enabled communication 
connected to a pressure sensor and an ultrasonic sensor. The sensor node in Sadeghioon, A.M. et al., 
2018 consists of a relative pressure sensor, temperature sensor, one attached to the pipeline wall and 
the other connected to soil in close proximity to the pipe. Abdelhafidh, M. et al. 2017 used a TelosB 
sensor node with a flow sensor and a pressure sensor. The above examples show the heterogeneity 
in the sensor selection used in the literature and the fact that there is no consensus on the sensor 
nodes to be used for monitoring WDN. 
Network connectivity 
Sensors in the context of IoT have to work collaboratively (rather, the information obtained from 
them) in order for it to be useful. For example, localization of leaks is only made possible by 
processing multiple time-synchronized data sets. Hence, it is important to study how individual 
sensors have been connected or networked. Sensor networks can be wired or wireless. Mohamed, N. 
et al., 2011 proposed multiple sensor node architectures for underwater pipelines, one of which is a 
wired sensor network. Needless to say, wired connections suffer from reliability issues resulting from 
damage to the wires in the network and installation cost issues. As a result, a vast majority of the IoT 
based leak detection systems are configured as wireless sensor networks (WSN). The following 
examples show that a variety of wireless technologies were used in literature.  
Whittle, A.J. et al., 2013 used a cellular modem with 3G connectivity to transmit data from sensor 
nodes to a remote server. Adedeji, K. et al., 2016 used ZigBee communication module to send data 
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from several Arduino micro-controllers to a central node. Data collected at the central node was then 
transferred to a remote computer using RS232 or LAN interface. Kartakis, S. et al., 2016 used six 
sensor nodes to collect data and four of them communicated data with a central server using an 
ethernet module and two of them communicated data with a central server using WiFi. Karray, F. et 
al., 2016, used a radio transceiver for data communication between sensor nodes and a central server. 
Stoianov, I. et al., 2007 used Bluetooth for communication between the data acquisition system and 
a single board computer, with GPRS for communication between a single board computer and a 
backend server. In Christodoulou, S. et al., 2010, data acquisition boards transmitted data to a 
Stargate gateway which in turn communicated data with a remote computer through GPRS link. 
Sadeghioon, A.M. et al., 2018 used a transmitter to send data from a sensor node to a laptop using 
radio frequency signals, following which a 3G cellular network was used to transmit this data to the 
cloud. Abdelhafidh, M. et al., 2017 used radio signals to send data from a group of sensor nodes 
called a cluster to a central location called the base station through a cluster head. AL-Kadi, T. et al., 
2013 proposed a magnetic induction-based communication between sensor nodes and a cluster head, 
which in turn communicated this data to a remote computer through electromagnetic waves. 
Data processing and decision making layer (DPDML) 
The downstream of measurement and communications in an IoT based leak detection system consists 
of processing and analyzing the collected data, detecting and localizing leaks, all of which constitute 
the data processing and decision making layer (DPDML). The data analysis methods in the DPDML 
can be classified as model-based approaches, signal processing methods, and knowledge based 
approaches. Model based approaches use concepts such as conservation of energy, conservation of 
mass or conservation of momentum to build a model to predict leaks. One such method that is widely 
used in many IoT based leak detection solutions is the Kalman filter. Karray, F. et al., 2016 used a 
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linear predictor Kalman filter to compress data for the identification of leaks. Signal processing based 
leak detection techniques involve signal analysis in time domain or frequency domain. Support 
vector machines, pattern recognition, expert systems are some of the examples that have been used 
based on signal processing techniques. Stoianov, I. et al., 2007 mainly used pattern recognition to 
detect leaks, where pressure data and flow sensor data were used to find large leaks, whereas to find 
small leaks acoustic data was used. A simple Haar wavelet transform was used to detect pressure 
pulses. Leaks were detected based on the wavelets associated with coefficients higher than 
predefined values and a cross-correlation algorithm was used to find leak locations. Romano, M. et 
al., 2013, employed several self-learning AI, statistical and geo-statistical algorithms for data 
analysis. These techniques included wavelets to de-noise pressure/flow signals captured from sensor 
nodes, artificial neural networks (ANNs) for short-term forecasting of the pressure/flow signal 
values, evolutionary algorithms to find the optimal ANN input structure, statistical process control 
techniques to study burst induced pressure/flow variations and geo-statistical techniques to find leak 
locations. Whittle, A.J. et al., 2013 employed wavelet decomposition method and time domain 
statistical analysis to detect transients that are the indicatives of leaks. Adedeji, K. et al., 2016 
employed improved negative pressure wave algorithm to detect leaks. Abdelhafidh, M. et al., 2017 
used real time transient and wave propagation methods to detect leaks, and a genetic algorithm 
optimization technique to find leak locations. Sadeghioon, A. M. et al., 2018 used a seasonal hybrid 
extreme studentized deviate (S-H-ESD) algorithm developed by Twitter to find leaks. Christodoulou, 
S. et al., 2010 used ANNs and fuzzy logic for detecting and localizing leaks. 
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2.2.2 Advantages of an IoT based solution 
One of the key advantages of employing IoT is the ability to scale sensors across large geographical 
areas and interoperability features in protocols such as HTTP, MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry 
Transport), which is central to platforms being able to communicate across devices from different 
vendors. Most IoT devices in the market today support HTTP, MQTT and other common protocols 
such as WiFi, Bluetooth and ZigBee which have been shown to be scalable. IoT enables remote 
monitoring of the WDN along with near real time data processing capabilities, which is crucial to 
detecting leaks and proactively addressing the issues that could result in saving valuable resources 
and money. 
 
2.2.3 Challenges in existing IoT leak detection solutions 
The main challenges in WSNs is the issue of power management as sensor nodes are typically 
powered using batteries. This problem can be overcome by using low power sensors (Mois, G. et al., 
2016), low power data acquisition boards (Kartakis, S. et al., 2015), light weight operating systems 
(Christodoulou, S. et al., 2010, used Tiny OS), low power network modules (Adedeji, K. et al., 2016 
used ZigBee network module) to send and receive data, sending compressed data (Karray, F. et al. 
2016) or features extracted from raw data (Feng, N. 2019) from edge nodes to the central node and/or 
using alternative energy sources such as solar (Christodoulou, S. et al., 2010). Rather than 
continuously collecting and sending data, intermittent capturing and sending of data from the data 
acquisition board to a central module can help reduce power consumption (Whittle, A. J. et al., 2013).  
The main use with the deployment of real-world IoT leak detection systems is in their scalability, 
which means that the IoT leak detection solution can be scaled to work well with potentially hundreds 
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or thousands of sensor nodes. This means that the data collected by those sensor nodes grows very 
quickly over a very short amount of time. Though modern single board computers or micro-
controllers (which collect data from sensors) are equipped with relatively large storage and 
processing abilities, modern sensors capture data at very high rates, which can outgrow the storage 
and processing capabilities of even modern single computers and micro-controllers. The large 
deployment of sensor nodes combined with high data rates of the sensors can forfeit the benefit of 
the of IoT if proper measures are not taken to store and process the growing volume of data. Most of 
the existing IoT leak detection systems have not specifically addressed this issue of exponential 
growth of data within their architectures and have mainly focused either on the power management 
issue (Kartakis, S. et al., 2015, Sadeghioon, A.M. et al., 2014, Stoianov, I. et al., 2007, AL-Kadi et 
al., 2013) or on developing a good leak detection algorithm (Adedeji, K. et al. 2016, Sadeghioon, 
A.M. et al. 2018). Clearly, a holistic approach where power management, algorithms and scalability 
work together is necessary for a practical solution to leak detection in large scale. 
There are many applications or frameworks available that can handle large varying volumes of 
heterogeneous data. For example, real time data analysis can be done using Apache Storm or Apache 
Spark streaming. A list of such frameworks is given in the Figure 2.4, but such applications only 
provide the framework to process varying volume of data and they still need supporting infrastructure 
such as computing resources, hard disks, CPUs, operating systems, regular back ups of data, 
upgrading the hardware and software and providing fault tolerant infrastructure by providing a 
distributed computing system. Such infrastructure maintenance along with the required applications 
(listed in Figure 2.4) that can process the Big Data, are provided by a modern computing paradigm, 
called cloud computing. 
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Figure 2.4 List of tools available to handle Big Data (Shadroo, S. et al., 2018) 
 
Ahmed, K.E.U. et al., 2011 proposed the integration of WSN with cloud computing. This approach 
solves a major problem of WSN in general, namely storing and processing large amounts of data. 
This approach of using cloud computing in WSN was applied to the leak detection in WDN as well. 
However only a handful of IoT leak detection solutions in literature have applied cloud computing 
to address the Big Data problem. Koo, D. et al., 2015 presented a conceptual development of an IoT 
application for Big Data collection through a large number of water clients. However, this is only a 
conceptual design without implementation. Rohit, A. et al., 2018, used IoT system for forecasting 
and monitoring water consumption in WDN, where only the design of the system is presented and 
no details were presented with regards top system evaluation. Cheung et al. 2014 proposed a cloud 
computing solution called INFOSAN SaaS provided by Optimale LTDA [4] to address water loss in 
urban water distribution systems. Due to the proprietary nature of this solution, technical details 
regarding accuracy and an objective evaluation of the results are not publicly available. Mounce, 
S.R. et al., 2015 proposed a solution for water leak detection using a cloud-based portal, YouShare 
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[5], available to academics and research institutions. However, YouShare is not a self service cloud 
portal where users can access cloud services directly, rather access requests have to be first approved 
by the YouShare administrator.  Arangoa, I. M. et al., 2014 used a cloud-based system, Azure Cloud 
[6], for data analysis and decision making in WDNs. This platform provides scalability in terms of 
running applications, where users can provision virtual machines (VMs) as needed. However, the 
process of provisioning VMs is manual and user input is needed for which user should have the 
knowledge regarding the number of VMs needed for data processing and often such information is 
not available a priori.  
Though many WSN based solutions for leak detection have been proposed for monitoring leaks in 
WDNs, none of these studies present an end-to-end solution which can address all the issues such as 
ease of use, scalability, heterogeneity in sources, storage at scale, security, real time leak detection 
and visualization of results. To the knowledge of the author, this study is the first attempt towards 
providing a detailed design and implementation for a scalable, cost effective cloud based IoT online 
leak detection system. The Google Cloud Platform (GCP) is selected for demonstration purposes, as 
GCP can securely process and analyse varying volume of real time data as well as batch data while 
providing significant flexibility and range of available tools for analytics. The architecture, GCP 
concepts and GCP components used in the implementation of the cloud solution for leak detection 
in this thesis are discussed next in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3   Architecture 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the architecture used in this thesis to implement a leak detection 
solution for WDNs, followed by a detailed review of each component used in the architecture. As 
the architecture in this thesis mainly follows an IoT framework, this has a DAL (data acquisition 
layer), a NL (network layer) and DPDML (data processing and decision making layer). Broadly 
speaking, DAL is connected to the DPDML using the NL. DAL collects time series data from the 
WDN at regular intervals, preprocesses it, calculates features and sends them over the NL to the 
DPDML for further analysis. NL provides wireless connectivity between the DAL and DPDML to 
enable communications between these two components. DPDML validates the data sources, 
validates the data (ingestion), stores the data, analyses it, checks for the presence of leak(s) in the 
WDN, and finally displays the results. The overall IoT architecture discussed above is described in 
the Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 displays the key DAL stages of acquiring, preprocessing data and feature 
extraction, along with other components, tools and devices used to accomplish those stages, e.g., 
MATLAB®, emulators, sensors and microprocessors. These details are described next. 
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Figure 3.1  IoT Architecture 
 
 
For the leak detection application, the DAL consists of a hydrophone sensor connected to a Teensy 
3.6 microcontroller. Because of limited access to a live WDN, the data collected from the DAL is 
stored on a computer, preprocessed and transferred to two types of emulators (Python client on a 
Windows 10 laptop and a combination of Python client on Raspberry Pi 3 and Hologram Cloud), 
where relevant features are calculated and then sent to the DPDML. The NL consists of WiFi, 
Internet and a Nova Hologram modem which provides 2G connectivity. DPDML solely consists of 
GCP.  
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3.2 Data acquisition layer 
3.2.1 Field hydrants, sensors and microcontrollers  
The data used in this thesis was collected from a live municipal WDN, which is the DMA11 in 
ClairFields, Guelph, Ontario (Figure 3.2), which is predominantly a residential district which uses a 
mix of 6-inch and 12-inch PVC water pipes. The hydrant locations where sensors were installed are 
clearly marked in red in Figure 3.2 and are numbered from 1 through 5. These addresses correspond 
to 70 clairfields, 105 clairfields, 30 Paulstown, 10 Murphy, and 38 Keys, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.2 Map of the test location and test hydrants in Guelph, Ontario 
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The data-acquisition hardware consisted of a microcontroller (Teensy 3.6) onboard a custom printed 
circuit board (PCB) with a 2G internet and GPS chip. Firmware on this microcontroller was written 
in C++ programming language with open source libraries such as digital signal processing (DSP) 
libraries, Adafruit FONA library and SD card libraries. DSP library was used for vector statistical 
calculations and feature calculations such as fast Fourier transformation (FFT), Adafruit FONA 
library was used for cellular GSM connection, and secure digital (SD) card library for storage using 
the SD card. This main circuit board was placed outside the hydrant above the ground level. A second 
board, called the sensor board, was located below the ground level located at the bottom of a modified 
fire hydrant stem, shown in the Figure 3.3 (a), (b) and (c). Communication between the two boards 
occurred using the serial peripheral interface (SPI) protocol. The sensor board consists of an on-
board 24-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC) chip to digitize the hydrophone, a pressure 
transducer, and a temperature sensor inputs. It is important to note that only the hydrophone data is 
used in this thesis for analysis purposes. 
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Figure 3.3 (a) Retrofitted fire hydrant showing the placement of a metal case, (b) sensor board 
inside a metal case and (c) A metal case  
 
The main board and the sensor board along with the sensors are shown in the Figure 3.4 (a), (b) and 
(c) respectively. The sensors were mounted on a retrofitted fire hydrant, which is a Century® fire 
hydrant make.  
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Figure 3.4 (a) Sensor board, (b) Main circuit board and (c) sensors. 
 
There are two settings under which the data was collected in the field: ambient (normal operating 
condition) and leak (simulated flows from the hydrant) condition. Ambient case does not necessarily 
mean that no leaks exist; it is merely meant to represent a baseline from which anomalies are 
detected. Simulated leaks were created from instrumented and un-instrumented hydrant locations by 
opening an external valve with an attached flow meter to measure outflow. The aforementioned leaks 
were simulated using two hydrants which were located in the same municipal WDN, DMA11 in 
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ClairFields, Guleph, where the data was collected. Figure 3.5 shows the leak locations and the fire 
hydrants where the sensors were installed to collect the hydrophone data. The leak locations are 
located in 54 Paulstown and 22 Keys, which correspond to leak location 1 and 2, respectively.  The 
leaks simulated on these hydrants correspond to various sizes, ranging from 200, 100, 50 or 25 
litres/minute and each leak data was captured for 10 minutes on October 13th and October 21st 2018 
on an SD card between 12:40 a.m. and 3 a.m. The ambient case data was captured on 13th, 19th, 20th 
and 21st of October, 2018, for 3 hours between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m.  The sensor locations in the Figure 
3.5 are the same fire hydrants with sensors shown in Figure 3.2. 
The data on the SD card consisted of saved .csv files. Small amounts of data collected from live 
WDN was sent directly to the Nova Hologram cloud, which was then communicated to GCP, mainly 
to test and demonstrate the communication functionality. However, a majority of the data used for 
analysis was collected offline in order to reduce cellular modem costs as the intention was to stay 
within the free data usage limit provided by Hologram. Hence, emulators are used in this thesis that 
partly act as the data acquisition layer. 
 33 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Hydrant locations 1 through 6 and Leak locations 1 and 2 
 
After the data is acquired from the WDN by the sensors, the next step is to perform analysis, which 
includes: (i) data preprocessing, (ii) extraction of features and (iii) data analysis.   
Data preprocessing is performed on a desktop computer, feature extraction is performed on emulators 
and machine learning algorithms (data analysis) are executed on GCP. The details of the each of the 
three subtasks of data analysis are explained in the following sections. 
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3.2.2 Data preprocessing 
For this thesis, the sensor data are retrieved from the storage devices from hydrant locations and 
processed offline using a desktop computer. As described previously, this is mainly to reduce the 
cost of wireless transmission as a separate paid plan was not purchased for this research. However, 
it is important to note that this does not compromise the representativeness to actual field 
implementation as many of the intermediate steps are either emulated (only the end results are of 
concern) or simulated (results in intermediate steps are also of interest) in a software environment. 
Data pre-processing includes the following two key operations: 
1. Data conversion: Raw data which is obtained from the hydrophone is not in physical units 
and is in electrical units, milli-voltage (mV). This is converted to physical units of acoustic 
pressure Pascals (Pa), using the acoustic receiving sensitivity of the hydrophone and 
accounting for the pre-gain (25dB) of the in-line amplification circuit which lies between the 
hydrophone and the ADC module. 
2. Data cleansing and sorting: Ideally, streaming data is captured without missing entries and in 
sequence. However, due to the internal hardware and software architecture on board the ADC 
and the main processing modules, on occasion there are missing entries and some data are 
stored out of sequence. Hence, both data cleansing and sorting operations need to be 
conducted prior to feature calculations. 
Fully simulating both the processes is outside the scope of this work as this depends on the exact 
hardware and firmware configuration to be used in final deployment. Instead, an emulator (laptop 
computer) is used for data cleansing and sorting and all the programs were written and executed in 
MATLAB® environment prior to being sent for feature extraction. 
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3.2.3 Feature extraction  
The next step in the data pre-processing step is feature extraction. Raw acoustic time series data are 
typically acquired at a high acquisition rate. In this application, the data rate used was approximately 
4000 samples/sec (approximate because the clock and the actual hardware and software 
configuration determines the exact value at which data is acquired and typically there is a small 
variation from the prescribed target rate). Assuming 4 bytes of storage for a float this translates to 
16kB/sec and for typical data acquisition time of 10 minutes at one hydrant location this results in10 
mega-bytes of data per acquisition. This data size does not account for other parameters such as time 
and headers, which also have to be stored and transmitted in addition to the sensor data. Hence, it is 
easy to envision a scenario where the data transmission size could be of the order of hundreds of 
Mega bytes or even Giga bytes for a small city with several sensors simultaneously collecting data 
for 10 minutes. 
 Clearly, transmitting the entire raw time series data over a cellular wireless network is expensive. 
Considering that the final leak detection algorithms will employ statistical features and not the raw 
time series themselves (may be necessary for correlation-based techniques, but this is not pursued 
here), it is expedient to calculate such features at the sensor node. Such features are smaller in size 
and hence involve significantly reduced transmission overheads. Hence, those features which are 
non-redundant and statistically independent of one another, yet representative of data under 
consideration, need to be extracted from time series data and transmitted for processing. According 
to Cody, R. et al., 2018, although it is easy to detect large changes in the hydraulic conditions within 
pipes, it is challenging to detect events in the presence of background noise such as flow caused by 
water usage. To address this issue, the authors of the aforementioned study used spectral peak and 
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root mean square (RMS) features derived from time series data for leak detection. Consistent with 
their findings, the same features are calculated on emulators (laptop and Raspberry Pi 3) and then 
readied for transmission. The features are calculated using a Python program executed on Raspberry 
Pi 3 (a single board computer) and the calculated features are then sent using the Python Nova 
Hologram software development kit (SDK) to the Hologram Cloud using Hologram 2G GSM 
connectivity. The features from Hologram Cloud are then transmitted to GCP using a HTTP POST 
request over the internet. The features (RMS and spectral peak) are also calculated on a laptop 
computer running Windows 10 and are then sent to GCP using a Python script via HTTP request 
over a WiFi connection.  
The features are calculated on two types of emulators, Raspberry Pi and a computer laptop, to 
simulate the scenario where the sensor nodes are from two different platforms. Raspberry Pi runs on 
the OS Raspbien which is the Debien flavor of Linux OS, while the laptop computer runs windows 
10 OS. Proper authentication is required prior to Hologram or the laptop emulator communicating 
the calculated features to GCP. Upon successful authentication by GCP, the features are then 
transmitted for downstream processing by GCP. There are two types of authentication methods: API 
key and OAuth 2.0. Nova Hologram Cloud supports only the API key authentication type, whereas 
the Python emulator supports both types of authentication. For this thesis, while API key is deemed 
sufficient, OAuth 2.0 is also implemented to test the overall architecture capabilities. The two 
authentication methods are described next. 
(i) API key: API keys are simple encrypted strings such as 
'AIzaSyAxLhEDXnG3h8ES6He76aW8wkFyOm6jiqE' which is provided by GCP. For 
API keys authentication, the emulator must include the API key in each HTTP POST 
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request. Upon the receipt of this HTTP POST request, GCP checks for the correctness of 
API key and if it is correct, the HTTP request is processed further; otherwise an error is 
sent back to the emulator. 
(ii) OAuth 2.0: For this type of authentication, the process is more involved. The first request 
from the emulator to GCP obtains credentials such as client ID and client secret which 
are known to both GCP and the emulator, which are then used to request an access token 
from the authorization server (Google). Such requests depend on the type of application. 
Javascript applications could request an access token using a browser redirect to the 
Google server, while a Python application like the emulator that is being used in this 
thesis requires GCP user (owner/admin of the GCP pipeline for data processing) to grant 
permission to the application that is requesting the access token by logging on to the 
computer where the emulator is running. An HTTP server is run as a part of emulator, at 
a predefined port 9004, to listen to the Google authorization server. When the GCP user 
grants permission, Google server sends the authorization code to the port 9004. Emulator 
uses this authorization code, exchanges it for access token with Google authorization 
server and sends the access token in an authorization header which is a secure way of 
sending the token to the Cloud function, which is GCP ingestion component. In OAuth 
2.0 authentication process, only the first request goes through the authentication process 
and obtains the access token from GCP and the rest of the requests to GCP use the access 
token obtained by the first request.  If the GCP user denies permission, an error message 
is sent by Google authorization server to the HTTP server running at port 9004. This 
authorization process is shown in the Figure 3.6.  
 38 
 
 
Figure 3.6 OAuth 2.0 process [7] 
The main advantage of the API key authentication is that it is simple to implement whereas OAuth 
is relatively more involved. API key authentication however provides a static key (i.e., the API key 
does not change once it is generated by GCP), whereas OAuth provides a dynamic access token (i.e., 
a new key is generated by GCP for a new authorization process) in response to an application request. 
In general, a dynamic key is more secure compared to static key, especially over time. However, 
OAuth requires GCP user’s (owner of the GCP resources that form a processing pipeline) presence 
to grant access to the requesting application (emulator) to access GCP. API key on the other hand, 
does not involve GCP user interaction with the requesting application. The static nature of API key 
can be changed by periodically changing the API key on GCP and distributing the newly generated 
key manually to authorized applications.  
3.2.4 Communication protocol 
GCP supports two communication protocols, HTTP and MQTT, to communicate with IoT devices 
(emulators in this case). A study conducted by Yokotani, T. et al., 2016 shows that MQTT is more 
advantageous over HTTP when used in the implementation of an IoT solution. HTTP however is 
simple to use and in this thesis, when the Python emulator on Raspberry Pi sends features to Nova 
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Hologram cloud, these are forwarded to GCP using HTTP only (Nova Hologram does not support 
MQTT at the time of writing this thesis). Hence, HTTP is used as the communication protocol 
between emulators and GCP in this thesis. The details of HTTP, MQTT and the study conducted by 
Yokotani, T. et al. 2016 are discussed below. 
HTTP is an application layer protocol in the internet protocol suite, also known as transport control 
protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) stack, which is a standard model provided for communication in 
internet and computer networks. HTTP is the foundation of data communication for the world wide 
web where resources such as documents, files, pictures and videos, can be easily accessed on a web 
browser or other HTTP clients such as the Python HTTP client. HTTP provides communication 
based on standard request response model (Fielding, R. T. et al. 1999). In the request response model, 
clients such as a web application or a program requests the server (for example, to access a resource 
on the server) and the server responds to such requests by providing the requested resource. HTTP 
provides various methods to carry out different operations on the aforementioned resources. Some 
of the popular methods are GET (request to retrieve a resource), POST (request to accept a resource 
provided), PUT (request to create or modify a resource) and DELETE (request to delete a resource). 
In the leak detection application, emulators provide data to be ingested by GCP. Typically, these are 
called POST requests. Like HTTP, MQTT is also an application layer protocol in the TCP/IP stack 
which provides communication based on the publish-subscribe model. In MQTT, the publisher of a 
message does not send the message directly to the receiver, instead categorizes messages into classes 
called topics without the knowledge of the subscriber, while storing such messages on shared 
messaging queues on the MQTT server or the MQTT broker. Similarly, subscribers express interest 
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in receiving messages of a particular class (topic) and they receive messages belonging to that topic 
from the MQTT server, or the MQTT broker.  
 Since HTTP operates over TCP/IP, such communications are deemed reliable. However, 
connections established between the client and the server for communication are not retained across 
subsequent requests. This causes overhead and consumption of network resources during 
communication (Yokotani, T. et al. 2016) as every HTTP request needs to establish connection 
between the client and the server and such connections include a client authentication process which 
consumes resources to carry out authentication. MQTT on the other hand requires a similar 
bandwidth as that of HTTP for establishing the initial connection between the MQTT broker and the 
MQTT client (either a subscriber or a publisher) as the communication requires authentication 
credentials to be sent from the MQTT client to the MQTT broker. Connection is retained across 
multiple requests and hence authentication credentials are not required to be sent in each request. 
This results in relatively less overhead and network bandwidth compared to HTTP. 
 Figure 3.7 shows the bandwidth used by HTTP requests and MQTT requests when 10 devices, 100 
devices and 1000 devices are used (Yokotani, T. et al. 2016) for different payload (data) sizes. This 
clearly shows that for a given payload size, for fewer devices (say 10), the bandwidth for both HTTP 
and MQTT protocols are comparable. However, as the number of devices increase (say to 100 or 
1000), MQTT uses far less bandwidth compared to HTTP. Since an IoT solution typically involves 
a large number of data sources, MQTT is a better choice for communication compared to HTTP. 
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Figure 3.7 Required bandwidth according to variable devices and payload sizes. (Source: Yokotani, 
T. et al. 2016) 
 
For the same aforementioned reason (that HTTP does not retain connection across requests), HTTP 
takes longer time for communication compared to MQTT. Table 3.1 shows the required duration for 
each protocol between the start and completion of communication. It is clear that the first MQTT 
request (#1) takes nearly the same duration as HTTP, while the second MQTT request takes 
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significantly less time compared to HTTP, both in terms of average and maximum times between 
the start and completion of the request. 
 MQTT 
#1 
MQTT 
#2 
HTTP 
No od Round Trips 4 1 5 
Required duration between 
start and completion 
MAX 800ms 200ms 1s 
AVE 400ms 100ms 500ms 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison between MQTT and HTTP with respect to communication duration (Source: 
Yokotani, T. et al. 2016) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the number of devices is small and the tests are conducted in controlled 
environments.  HTTP is widely supported by many applications including the Nova Hologram Cloud 
and GCP used in this thesis. Hence, for demonstration purposes HTTP is used, although in practical 
full-scale implementations of this technology involving a large number of devices MQTT would be 
the preferred protocol option. 
 
3.3 GCP 
GCP [8] is offered as “Software as a Service” (SaaS) which depends on internet to provide its service. 
This means GCP provides its users access to its infrastructure such as hardware resources including 
storage hard disks, servers, networking, computing and software resources such as operating 
systems, software applications and databases via the internet. Google locates its infrastructure at 
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various physical locations called data centres around the world and manages those resources, which 
includes all the physical connectivity of the computers, upgrading the computers, backups, upgrading 
the operating systems and resolving networking issues. Users can rent services offered by GCP and 
pay only for the resources used and for the duration those resources are used.  As well, GCP provides 
easy to use APIs which can interface with all the infrastructure offered and provides the above 
mentioned infrastructure at a scale required for IoT implementation, including data collection, 
processing and analysis of large amounts of data. The overall process pipeline and various 
components of GCP used in this thesis are illustrated in Figure 3.8. To provide readers with a 
complete picture of the overall architecture used other components namely DAL and NL are also 
shown in the Figure. The four different stages namely, ingestion, storage, analysis and visualization 
of results are discussed next. 
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Figure 3.8 The process pipeline used in this thesis with various GCP sub-components. 
  
3.3.1 Ingestion 
Cloud Functions 
Data from the source, i.e., from the Python client or from the Hologram Cloud (using HTTP POST 
requests as described previously), is first verified by the GCP to ascertain the legitimacy of the 
source, for the validity of the data type, and for the validity of the request. These checks are carried 
out at the ingestion stage using the Cloud Function subsystem of the GCP. Cloud Function is central 
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to ingestion tasks in the process pipeline and acts as an event listener which responds to events such 
as HTTP trigger, an incoming message on Cloud Pub/Sub for a given topic, a file upload on Cloud 
Storage or a log change in Google Analytics API. Since HTTP is used as a trigger from the data 
source in this thesis, Cloud Function responds to such HTTP requests and carries out the following 
tasks: 
1. Respond to the HTTP event. 
a. Check for HTTP POST requests. 
b. Check for authentication of the data source. 
c. Perform data validation. 
d. Form an output JSON data consisting of the data provided by the emulators and 
encode it into a byte string format. 
2. Invoke other services. 
a. Send the encoded output data to a temporary storage component or an API of GCP 
such as Cloud Pub/Sub using HTTP POST request. 
3. Write back to the event generator. 
a. Send a response to data source (emulator) that triggered Cloud Function. 
The above tasks are illustrated in Figure 3.9 as well. 
 
Figure 3.9  Pipeline showing ingestion of data by Cloud Function 
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Since Cloud Function is managed by GCP, it can scale from a few invocations to millions of 
invocations without the need for users to manage the underlying infrastructure. Instead, users write 
a simple event handler function on Cloud Function API using a programming language such as 
Python to respond to an event such as the HTTP trigger from an emulator. In this thesis, Python 3.7.1 
is used on Flask web framework to write an event handler which performs all the ingestion tasks 
mentioned earlier. Flask is a small and powerful web framework which is provided as a default 
framework by GCP and is used with Python to build web applications quickly.   
 
3.3.2 Storage 
Once the data source and the data are validated, the data is stored for further analysis. There are two 
types of storage used, temporary and permanent, depending on the type of processing which is carried 
out on the data. Both the types of storage are discussed below. 
Temporary storage: Temporary storage components used for this thesis are Cloud Pub/Sub and 
Cloud Storage. Temporary storage is utilized when programs (e.g., data processing code on Cloud 
Dataflow) need a location to stage the binary executable files during execution. Temporary storage 
used for this application is the Cloud Storage. When the data is streamed, which is the kind of data 
generated continuously by the data sources, such data is incrementally processed using stream 
processing techniques without the need to access all the data at any given time. In the current 
application, emulators transmit this incrementally, one set of features at a time at a pre-determined 
frequency, say every second. Temporary storage used in this case is Cloud Pub/Sub, which 
temporarily stores the streaming data and forwards it to the data processing unit Cloud Dataflow. 
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Note that Cloud Storage is also used as permanent storage and hence this is discussed in the 
permanent storage section. Cloud Pub/Sub details are provided next. 
Cloud Pub/Sub 
Cloud pub/sub acts as a temporary storage while providing real-time messaging service which allows 
applications to send and receive messages. Cloud pub/sub is an auto-scalable GCP-managed event 
ingestion and delivery system, which is suitable for stream analytics pipelines. It provides many-to-
many asynchronous messaging, i.e., many senders can send messages to many receivers without 
senders and receivers being present at the same time. This provides a decoupled system which is 
flexible for both senders and receivers to post and receive messages at their convenience. Cloud 
Pub/Sub servers are distributed at various Google’s data centers around the world. Different 
instances of a cluster which is a logical grouping of machines that share the same local network and 
power are located in data centers. Cloud pub/sub is a global service that is divided into mainly two 
parts: data plane and control plane. Data plane servers are responsible for moving messages from the 
Publisher to the Subscriber. Control plane servers are responsible for assigning Publishers and 
Subscribers to a data plane. Publishers and Subscribers are unaware of the physical locations of the 
Pub/Sub servers and they can publish and subscribe messages across large geographical distances. 
Cloud Pub/Sub follows the following rules to deliver messages: 
1. Publisher or a sender of a message can send messages to Cloud Pub/Sub only using a named 
resource called “topic”. For example, an HTTP client can send telemetry to Cloud Pub/Sub 
using a topic called “sensor”.  
2. The receiver of a message or a Subscriber can receive messages from Cloud Pub/Sub topic 
only if a subscription is created by that subscriber to that topic. Subscription is a named entity 
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that subscriber creates for a topic that associates Subscriber to that topic. Only those messages 
that are published after the subscription to a given topic is created are available to the 
Subscriber of that topic.  
3. Topics can have multiple Subscribers as well as multiple Publishers. However, subscription 
belongs to a single topic. Cloud Pub/Sub delivers every message to every subscription at least 
once.  
4. Each message is by default kept for the maximum of 7 days. If there is no subscription 
available before the expiration time, that message will no longer be accessible. The message 
retention time can be configured between 10 minutes to 7 days. If there is no subscription 
available to a topic and if Publishers publish messages to that topic, then those messages will 
not be delivered even after a new Subscriber creates a subscription to that topic. Subscriptions 
by default expire after 31 days of inactivity. The deletion clock is reset every time there is 
Subscriber activity. The expiration time can be configured and subscriptions can be made 
persistent regardless of activity.  
5. When the Cloud Pub/Sub is waiting for an acknowledgement from a Subscriber for a sent 
message before the deadline, the message is called an “outstanding message”. Once the 
message is sent to a Subscriber, that Subscriber sends an acknowledgement back to Cloud 
Pub/Sub within a limited time, called acknowledgement deadline which is defined by each 
Subscriber. Once the deadline passes, Cloud Pub/Sub resends the message to that Subscriber 
to ensure at least one-time delivery. Pub/Sub delivers messages in the order in which they 
were published. However, sometimes the messages may be delivered out of order or delivered 
more than once. So, Subscribers should make sure that such messages are handled properly.   
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When the Publisher publishes a message to Cloud Pub/Sub, this is written to storage. Subscribers 
can retrieve messages either by a Pull or a Push mechanism. This type can be configured by the 
Subscriber anytime. In a Pull subscription, the Subscriber initiates the request to obtain messages 
from the Pub/Sub server. The sequence of operations that occur in a Pull request is described in 
Figure 3.10. The Subscriber initiates a request to the Pub/Sub server for messages for which Pub/Sub 
responds with a message or error and an acknowledgement ID. The Subscriber then acknowledges 
the delivery to Pub/Sub using this acknowledgement ID. 
 
Figure 3.10 Pub/Sub pull subscription 
 
In a Push subscription, Pub/Sub initiates an HTTP request to send messages to the Subscriber 
application, which then sends acknowledgement back to Pub/Sub for both success and failure. This 
is shown in the Figure 3.11. In the case of failure, Pub/Sub resends the message.  
 
Figure 3.11 Pub/sub push subscription 
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In this work only the Pull subscription is used by Cloud Dataflow and the topic used is called 
“hydrophone”. Default settings are used for subscription inactivity duration and message retention 
time. The publisher is the Cloud Function and the Subscriber is Cloud Dataflow (described later). 
Permanent storage: Permanent storage is used to permanently store large amounts of data. The data 
stored in permanent storage can also be used for batch processing, which involves waiting for the 
entire data to arrive completely before the actual processing of the data begins.  The type of 
permanent storage used depends on the specific application and two scenarios are possible within 
permanent storage, as follows: 
1. Cloud Storage is used to store a large amount of data in the file format. For example, in this 
thesis, training data sets and the training model are stored on Cloud Storage permanently for 
further use by the Cloud Machine Learning engine (Cloud ML engine) for downstream 
analysis and decision making. 
2. BigQuery is used to store a large amount of data in the in a table format. Such storage   
facilitates SQL-like queries to work with that data. This type of permanent storage is used to 
store the processed data and the results of processing (in case of stream processing) and data 
to be processed (in case of batch processing). 
Cloud Storage is explained in this section whereas BigQuery is explained under visualization of 
results, as this is used in that stage as well.   
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Cloud Storage  
Cloud Storage could be both temporary or permanent in nature and provides storage and retrieval of 
any amount of data at any time for a range of scenarios such as temporary storage for program 
execution, serving website, storing data for archival and disaster recovery. All the data on Cloud 
Storage belongs to a project. Buckets are the basic storage containers that hold data. When a Bucket 
is created in the Storage Class, three properties need to be specified: unique global name, a location 
where the Bucket and its contents are stored and a Storage Class. There are four Storage Classes 
available: multi-regional, regional, nearline and coldline storage.  
(i) Multi-regional storage: In multi-regional storage, data is stored in multiple geographical 
locations. This is suitable for storing data that is accessed frequently such as those serving 
website content.  
(ii) Regional storage:  The data is stored only in a specific region instead of having 
redundancy. Since the data is stored only in a specific region, this storage cost is low.  
(iii) Nearline storage:  This storage is highly durable, low cost and suitable for storing 
infrequently accessed data. It requires minimum of 30-day storage. This is suitable for 
data back-up and disaster recovery storage.  
(iv) Coldline storage: It is similar to nearline storage except that this data is available within 
seconds not hours or days. Again, this is suitable for data back-ups and disaster recovery.   
By default, if the Storage Class is not specified, multi-regional storage class is used to create a 
Bucket. Data stored in the Cloud Storage is redundant and the data is stored in at least two geographic 
locations to ensure redundancy. Data inside each resource in the Cloud Storage is opaque to Cloud 
Storage. Each object stored in Cloud Storage is immutable which means that it cannot change 
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between its creation and deletion. This means that once a file is created, users or applications cannot 
undertake “append” or “truncate” operations. The object can only be overwritten, i.e., a new version 
of the same object can be created. 
Data is encrypted prior to it being stored on Cloud Storage. There are two types of encryptions, 
client-side encryption (while the user uploads data) and server-side encryption (encrypted before the 
data written to a persistent disk). No additional configuration is required and when read by an 
authorized user such data is transparently and automatically decrypted. In this thesis, Cloud Storage 
is used as a temporary location for holding intermediate files and directories for Cloud Dataflow. It 
is also used by Cloud ML engine to store machine learning models and input data.  Regional storage 
class was specified when a storage Bucket was created. 
Cloud SDK 
GCP services can be accessed in three different ways: (i) using programming languages such as 
Python and Java; (ii) using GCP website console.cloud.google.com; and (iii) using Cloud SDK. 
Cloud SDK provides a set of command line tools which include gcloud, gsutil, and bq and core 
libraries. These commands and their use are given below. 
gcloud: This manages interaction with GCP APIs and authentication. 
bq: This is used for working with data in BigQuery. 
gsutil: This is used for working with Cloud Storage. 
Core: Libraries used internally by Cloud SDK. 
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In this work gsutil is used to upload data files and machine learning models from the local machine 
to Cloud Storage. 
3.3.3 Data processing and analysis 
GCP enables data to be processed in batch as well as in streaming mode. In batch processing, 
processing of data is performed upon the arrival of all data, whereas in stream processing or real time 
processing, data is processed as and when the data arrives. Figure 3.12 illustrates the sequence of 
GCP subcomponents invoked during data processing in stream (the black arrows) and in batch 
processing (red arrows) modes. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 The sequence of GCP sub-components invoked for stream and batch processing. 
 
In the context of the current leak detection application, acoustic data stored in Cloud Pub/Sub in the 
case of stream processing and the data stored in BigQuery in the case of batch processing are 
processed to detect patterns and anomalies in the data. Cloud Dataflow is used for stream and batch 
processing and the AI Platform Notebook is used for fetching data from BigQuery and calling Cloud 
ML for batch prediction and visualization of result (from both batch and stream processing). For both 
batch and stream processing, training of data, creating the training model, and model prediction are 
 54 
 
performed using the Cloud ML engine, which is a component provided by GCP. The same GCP 
components are used in both stream and batch processing.  In stream processing, Cloud ML is 
invoked by Cloud Dataflow whereas in batch processing, Cloud ML is invoked by AI Platform 
Notebook. Cloud Dataflow and Cloud ML engine are explained next and the AI Platform Notebook 
is explained in the visualization of results section. 
Cloud Dataflow 
Cloud Dataflow is a managed data processing pipeline which works on the Apache Beam framework. 
Apache Beam is a unified open source programming model which enables developers to develop 
both batch and streaming pipelines, with relatively minor modifications to the settings of the pipeline 
definition. The default mode of processing is batch and Apache Beam allows parallel processing of 
data as well and supports Java and Python software development kit (SDK). Cloud Dataflow 
manages all the low-level tasks of distributed processing such as sharding (partitioning) data sets on 
the disks and coordinating individual worker computers which perform data processing tasks, while 
providing useful abstractions in the form of Apache Beam which insulates all such details from users. 
The abstractions provided by Apache Beam to work on a large-scale distributed data processing are 
described as follows. 
(i) Pipeline: The tasks of reading the input data from the source, transforming the data and 
writing the output to a sink are all encapsulated in a programming object called, Pipeline. 
Dataflow programming begins with creating this Pipeline object, which is then used for 
creating data sets called PCollection.  
(ii) PCollection: This represents datasets in Dataflow and can hold datasets of a fixed size 
or varying size.  
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(iii) Transforms: The input data is processed in Dataflow and the processing operation is 
called Transformation. Transformation takes one or more PCollection as inputs and 
performs operations specified by the user on each element in that collection and produces 
one or more PCollection as outputs. There are various Transforms which can be applied 
on data and those used in this thesis are discussed towards the end of this section. 
(iv) Runners: Runners execute the software Pipeline objects. The two Runners available are 
DirectRunner and DataFlowRunner. DirectRunner executes the pipeline code on a 
user’s local machine (often used for testing the Dataflow code before it is deployed on 
cloud) whereas DataFlowRunner executes the pipeline code on the cloud.  By default, 
Virtual Machines (VMs) that are allotted for running Dataflow jobs are automatically 
deleted when the job is completed. This means that any persistent disks attached to a 
particular VM are deleted automatically when the job is completed and the files stored on 
those disks are deleted as well. So, in order to avoid data loss, users need to provide (in 
the command prompt while executing the Dataflow job) --staging_location and/or -
-temp_location which specify the Cloud Storage paths where the intermediate files 
from pipeline execution should be stored. 
Cloud Dataflow subscriber on its own requests Cloud Pub/Sub for any new messages and processes 
such messages if there is any new message. This asynchronous Pull provides higher throughput as 
the application does not have to block a new message. Synchronous Pull is also available, where new 
messages are blocked until the Subscriber finishes processing the old message. Unless specified, 
asynchronous Pull is used and this setting is not changed in this thesis. Also, in this thesis, the data 
source used is Cloud Pub/Sub and the sink used is BigQuery. Apache Beam with Python SDK is 
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used with a streaming pipeline for the data, with DataFlowRunner. For stream processing, the 
following data Transformations are applied: 
 Read the data from Cloud Pub/Sub. 
 Decode the data from input format (byte string format) to the format readable by Cloud 
Dataflow (utf-8). 
 Extract data values from JSON data embedded in utf-8 string. 
 Predict the class of data using one-class support vector machine (OCSVM). 
 Create a record containing the results as well as the input data in the format (JSON encoded 
in utf-8 string) which is compatible with BigQuery. 
 Write the record to BigQuery. 
For batch processing, the data is streamed through Cloud Dataflow, stored in BigQuery, followed by 
the execution of the one-class support vector machine (OCSVM) algorithm (written in Python 
programming language) on the entire data set using AI Platform Notebook and Cloud ML engine. 
Cloud ML engine 
This is a GCP managed service which provides training and prediction tools for developers to build 
and run machine learning models. Cloud ML engine supports the Python programming language 
used on popular frameworks such as Tensorflow, Scikit-learn and XGBoost to perform machine 
learning on data. The Cloud ML work-flow is shown in Figure 3.13, where the filled boxes 
correspond to GCP managed services. 
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Figure 3.13 Cloud ML work-flow, where the filled boxes represent GCP managed services. 
The steps involved in developing a production ready machine learning model which can be used for 
prediction on stream as well as batch data are:  
1) Collect and prepare data. 
2) Develop a user model, train it, evaluate it and tune the hyper-parameters. 
3) Deploy the above trained model on Cloud ML engine. 
4) Send prediction requests to this trained model; this can be either batch or online (for 
streaming data) requests. 
5) Monitor the predictions. 
6) Manage the model and model versions. 
As discussed previously, in this thesis, both batch and online predictions are used. Cloud Dataflow 
sends a stream (online) prediction request to Cloud ML whereas, the user defined Python code on AI 
Platform Notebook sends a batch prediction request on the data stored in BigQuery. For prediction 
OCSVM with Gaussian radial basis functions (RBF) kernel is used by Cloud ML.  
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3.3.4 Visualization of results 
Once the data processing stage is completed, the results of processing are visualized using AI 
Platform Notebook, which in turn uses BigQuery. The details of BigQuery and AI Platform Notebook 
are provided next. 
BigQuery 
BigQuery belongs to both storage and visualization stages of DPDML in the overall architecture. 
Storing and querying a large amount of data produced by a large number of IoT devices can be quite 
challenging, time consuming, and expensive without the right hardware and infrastructure. To 
address this, GCP provides BigQuery which is a Petabyte scale low cost data warehouse that is fully 
managed by GCP. BigQuery provides super-fast SQL style querying interface to define and 
manipulate data records. This API can be accessed using multiple tools such as GCP web UI, 
command line tool or through REST API calls using client libraries provided in various languages 
such as Java, .net, or Python. BigQuery manages storing the data, including compression, encryption, 
replication, performance tuning and scaling. It supports several input formats, comma separated 
values (CSV), JSON, AVRO source format, amongst others. Once imported, data is converted to 
internal columnar format. Every column in addition to its value, stores two numbers, definition and 
repetition level which helps in keeping track of the nested structure. Data can be loaded on to 
BigQuery either through the batch load or through the stream load. 
In batch load, the data is loaded from files. The default source format for batch loading is CSV and 
these files can be loaded from Cloud Storage or from other Google services. BigQuery supports both 
UTF-8 and ISO-8859-1 data formats. By default, UTF-8 encoding is enabled. In the case of stream 
load, data is added to BigQuery one record at a time. Client libraries of supported languages such as 
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Java, Go, Python, php, C#, Ruby can be used to stream data into BigQuery. In this thesis, Dataflow 
creates tables and stream loads the data along with the results of inference using the Python client 
library. The data is sent as JSON in utf-8 format. BigQuery is also used by AI-Platform Notebook to 
query the batch data, perform batch prediction on the queried data, query the stream processing data 
and to display the stream processing ML results. 
AI Platform Notebook 
AI Platform Notebook is used for both data analysis as well as for result visualization activities and 
enables users to use VM instances equipped with latest data science and machine learning libraries 
such as the suite of Python and Deep Learning packages, Tensorflow and Pytorch. It provides 
Jupyterlab instances through a protected, publicly available notebook instance URL. Jupyterlab is an 
open-source web application that allows users to create, edit, execute code. In this thesis, AI Platform 
Notebook is used for both batch processing of the data and visualization of the results from both 
batch and stream processing. For batch processing, AI Platform Notebook uses Cloud ML engine 
which in turn uses Scikit-learn Python libraries which are equipped with the OCSVM module to 
enable prediction. The results of prediction and data analysis are described in the next chapter. 
 
3.4 Data flow diagram 
The overall data flow between the various components of IoT architecture used in this thesis for leak 
detection (as discussed in previous sections in this chapter), is shown in the Figure 3.14. 
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Figure 3.14  Data flow diagram between various IoT components used in this thesis. 
 
The raw hydrophone data was acquired using a Teensey 3.6 microcontroller and transferred to a 
laptop. Following this, a custom MATLAB code was used to extract the time series. Then, using 
emulators, features were extracted and sent to GCP over the network layer. On GCP, the features 
were ingested by Cloud Function after verifying the data source and forwarded to Cloud Pub/Sub 
for temporary storage and then sent to Cloud Dataflow. In stream processing, each feature set was 
sent to Cloud ML for prediction. OCSVM model was stored on Cloud Storage and linked to Cloud 
ML. Cloud ML used the trained model from Cloud Storage to perform prediction. Dataflow also used 
Cloud Storage to store the executable code for running the Apache Beam framework. For stream 
processing, the results of prediction along with the original data from Cloud Pub/Sub are stored in 
BigQuery, following which the results are displayed on AI Platform Notebook. In batch processing, 
the data received by Cloud Dataflow is forwarded to BigQuery and processed by Cloud ML and the 
results were displayed on AI Platform Notebook. In batch processing too, CloudML used the model 
stored on Cloud Storage. 
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Chapter 4   GCP Implementation and Leak Detection 
Results 
 
 
  4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the implementation details of data acquisition, data pre-processing and feature 
extraction along with data analysis and the results of ML engine prediction (leak detection). The 
implementation details of the remaining IoT components in the pipeline discussed in Chapter 3 such 
as emulators (Raspberry Pi3, Nova Hologram cloud and laptop emulator) and GCP (Cloud Function, 
Cloud Pub/Sub, Cloud Dataflow, BigQuery, Cloud ML, AI Platform NoteBook, Cloud Storage) are 
provided in Appendix A.  
 
4.2 Data acquisition layer 
Seven hydrants were used for the data acquisition activity, where five instrumented hydrants (one 
through five from Figure 4.1) were used for collecting acoustic pressure data and two hydrants were 
used to simulate leaks. Data collected from the instrumented hydrants were categorized into ambient 
and leak cases, where “ambient” represents the baseline condition prior to simulating leaks by 
opening a valve on a hydrant and “leak” corresponds to the case where a valve was opened to 
atmospheric pressure. Leak sizes achieved during this study corresponded to: 200 (size A), 100 (size 
B), 50 (size C) and 25 (size D) litres/minute. These flow amounts were verified by attaching an 
external flow measurement device to the hydrant used for simulation. Ambient data collected on the 
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13th, 19th, 20th and 21st of October 2018, Leak 1 (location 54 Paulstown) data collected on the 13th 
and 21st and Leak 2 (location 22 Keys) data collected on the 21st of October are used for further 
analysis in this thesis.  
 
4.3 Data pre-processing 
The data collected from the WDN was converted to CSV format, which was then transferred to a 
personal computer (laptop, 64 bit, windows 10 operating system and Intel Core, 2.8GHz, 8GB RAM) 
for pre-processing. After pre-processing, the file containing the hydrophone data—converted to 
physical units of pressure (in Pascals)—is sorted in an ascending order and stored (using a portable 
storage device) in ASCII format and readied for ingestion by the emulators. This manual offline 
process could be easily automated either by transmitting the raw data wirelessly or by using a 
conventional computer at the sensor location. Both options were deemed too expensive for pilot 
demonstration purposes, while the latter is associated with an additional problem of securing the 
computer on site and providing remote power. In practical scaled implementation, this process needs 
to be automated and warrants additional investigation; however, this is not a serious impediment in 
the context of the central objectives in this thesis.  
Typical pre-processed time series for ambient, size A, size B, size C and size D leak1 (Figure 4.1) 
data collected from the hydrant3 (Figure 4.1), are shown in the Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.1  Hydrant locations 1 through 6 and Leak locations 1 and 2 
 
From Figure 4.2, it is clear that larger leaks (size A) are associated with higher amplitude compared 
to smaller leaks (size B, size C and size D) and ambient data and in general the amplitudes are in the 
descending order starting with the largest leak size. It is important to note here that the amplitudes 
are not stationary over time and hence traditional techniques such as control charts in tandem with 
thresholds cannot be used in this application. In other words, the range of operational variability 
typically masks variations due to leaks if the correct baselines are not employed. Hence, more 
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sophisticated anomaly detection techniques have to be employed for leak predictions. Furthermore, 
since transmitting raw time series is associated with significant bandwidth requirements, instead, 
only the features extracted from the time series data are sent over the network to GCP. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Typical time series for ambient and simulated leaks of size A, size B, size C and size D 
leak1 data collected from Hydrant 3. 
 
4.4 Feature extraction 
One of the main pre-processing steps is the extraction of features and the associated calculations 
(algorithmic steps to calculate the features). Such feature calculations could be undertaken either on 
the micro-controller board (Teensy 3.6) or on an external computer by ingesting the hydrophone data 
from the microcontroller unit. Direct implementation on the micro-controller was not undertaken for 
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this thesis and the feature calculations were emulated on a computer laptop and on a Raspberry Pi 3 
as though they could be processed after ingesting the data from a storage device on-board the data 
acquisition system. 
Two features, RMS and spectral peak are deemed the most useful for anomaly detection, as reported 
in a previous study (Cody, R. et al. 2017). The programming language used in this thesis for feature 
calculations was Python. RMS provides a measure of the energy contained within a fixed time 
segment of time series data and is calculated using the equation:  
                                                  (1) 
where, xi represents the time series data value and n represents the length of the samples used to 
calculate the RMS, which is 4000 (sampling frequency is 4 kHz, which corresponds to a 1 sec RMS). 
While RMS provides a notion of the time-averaged energy content, spectral peak is the maximum 
value in the array of elements obtained by carrying out discrete Fourier transform (DFT) on the time 
series data.  DFT is the discrete version of the FT which transforms a time signal (or a discrete 
sequence) from the time domain representation to its frequency domain representation. This 
transformation (discrete case) is mathematically defined by (Cooley, J. W. et al., 1965):  
                                  (2) 
where, N is the number of elements in the sequence, xn represents the time domain values 
(hydrophone data), is a primitive Nth root of unity. DFT converts equally spaced samples 
from the time domain to the frequency domain, where the number of transformed points in the 
 66 
 
frequency domain remains the same as in the time domain. Time complexity of DFT calculation of 
n data points by using the definition given in the mathematical equation (2) is O(n2). This means that 
for large transforms (n is large), time taken by DFT is very large (quadratic time). To reduce the 
computing time of large transforms, more complex but less time-consuming algorithm, the fast 
Fourier transform (FFT) is used. FFT is an efficient algorithm which computes DFT (Cooley, J. W. 
et al., 1965 and Press, W.  et al., 2007) on a pre-specified number of fixed frequency points (2N, 
where N is an integer) and the time complexity of FFT is O(n log n) (quasilinear time) which is far 
less than O(n2) for n>1. Since FFT is faster and efficient, this is used as a feature in this thesis.  
RMS and spectral peak features are calculated on the data collected for every second. For example, 
for a time series containing 160,000 rows of hydrophone data, the number of feature rows is 40 for 
each feature (40 x 2 matrix). The features calculated on the time series data were sent at an interval 
of 1 second from the emulator to GCP using HTTP POST request. The implementation (coding) 
details of emulators and GCP cloud components are discussed in Appendix A.  
 
4.5 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was performed on various acoustic time-series data sets. The first data set 
consisted of training (ambient only) and testing data (ambient and leak data) collected on the 13th of 
October 2018. The second data set consisted of training (ambient only) and testing data (ambient and 
leak data) collected on the 21st of October 2018. The third data set contains training data (only 
ambient) from the 19th, 20th and 21st of October and testing data (both ambient and leak) from the 
21st of October 2018. The main motivation for this analysis is to investigate the sensor locations 
which were sensitive to Leak 1 and locations which were sensitive to Leak 2. The details of the 
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number of features used for this sensitivity analysis towards Leak 1 are provided in the Table 4.1 
and those corresponding to Leak2 are provided in Table 4.2.  
 
From the results in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, it is clear that significant compression of data is achieved 
by calculating the features rather than using the raw time series on their own. For example, the total 
number of feature sets from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 taken together is nearly 85,000, which is a 
significant reduction from the original 340x106 discrete time values in the original data. This 
reduction results in a reasonably small number of data values which need to be processed for the 
ensuing sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
1st 
dataset  number of features sets 
Hydrant 
ambient 
training 
(13th of 
October, 
2018)  
ambient 
testing 
(13th of 
October, 
2018) size A size B size C size D 
1 4762 180 179 179 179 179 
2 4762 180 180 180 180 180 
4 1596 180 181 181 182 181 
5 1596 180 180 180 180 180 
 
Table 4.1 The number of features sets used for sensitivity analysis for Leak 1. 
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 2nd and 
3rd 
datasets Number of feature sets 
Hydrant 
ambient training 
(19th and 20th and 
21st of October, 
2018)  
ambient 
training 
(21st of 
October, 
2018) 
ambient 
testing data 
(21st of 
October, 
2018) 
size A 
(21st of 
October, 
2018) 
size B 
(21st of 
October, 
2018) 
size C 
(21st of 
October, 
2018) 
size D 
(21st of 
October, 
2018) 
1 11505 547 180 180 60 60 180 
2 12208 547 180 179 178 60 180 
4 12120 502 180 193 194 194 193 
5 12258 502 180 180 178 180 180 
6 12661 1540 180 179 179 180 179 
 
Table 4.2 The number of features sets used for sensitivity analysis for Leak 2. 
 
To test the sensitivity of the instrumented hydrant locations to Leak1, the first data set was considered 
which consisted of October 13th ambient data and Leak 1 data for all sizes. The feature graphs for 
sizes A, B, C and D for all the hydrants for which the data was available are shown in Figures 4.3, 
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. From a simple observation of the feature clusters, it readily apparent that the 
instrumented Hydrant 3 is senstive (the ambient and leak classes are separable) to Leak 1 for sizes 
A, B and C. The instrumented Hydrant 4 is also sensitive to Leak 1, but only for large leak sizes such 
as A and B. Hydrant 3 is sensitive to Leak 1 (sizes A, B and C) because Hydrant 3 is the closest 
hydrant to Leak 1 (at a distance of 109.1m) on the  map (Figure 4.1). The next hydrant that is closer 
to Leak 1 is Hydrant 4 (at a distance 110.7m from Leak1 (figure 4.1)). So Hydrant 4 is also sensitive 
to Leak 1(but only for sizes A and B). So it can be concluded that the data collected at an instrumented 
hydrant that is the closest to a leak shows the highest sensitivity towards that leak and sensitivity 
towards a leak  is directly proportional to distance of the hydrant location where the data is collected. 
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Figure 4.3 Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size A) data from October 13th, for various 
hydrants. 
 
Figure 4.4  Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size B) data from October 13th, for various 
hydrants. 
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Figure 4.5 Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size C) data from October 13th, for various hydrants. 
 
Figure 4.6 Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size D) data from October 13th, for various hydrants. 
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The sensitivity analysis was carried out on Leak 2 as well to confirm that the distances of the 
instrumented hydrants from a leak play a major role in determining whether the features extracted 
(from the data collected) from those hydrants show sensitivity towards that leak. 
Figures  4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show the two-dimentional feature plots of ambient data and Leak 2 
data conducted on the October 21st 2018, for sizes A, B, C and D at various instrumented hydrant 
locations. It can be seen from the feature maps that the instrumented Hydrant 5 is senstive to leak 2 
(as the ambient and leak cases are clearly seperable into two distinct classes), sizes A, B and C. 
However, none of the instrumented hydrants are sensitive to size D Leak 2. From the above 
discussion, it is clear that the features RMS and spectral peak can be used to observe the sensitivity 
of instrumented hydrants towards various leaks and that the data collected from instrumented 
hydrants that are closer (upto a distance of around 120 meters) to the leaks show more sensitivity 
towards that leak. 
 
Given that the instrumented Hydrant 3 is more sensitive to Leak 1 and the instrumented Hydrant 5 
is more sensitive to Leak 2 compared to other hydrants, the results of prediction using OCSVM 
algorithm (using Sklearn Python code library) are presented for the instrumented Hydrants 3 and 5 
in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, respectively. These results are discussed later in this Chapter after 
evaluating the prediction model. The process of training the OCSVM algorithm, evaluating the 
performance of each model (through grid search) and obtaining the prediction results are provided 
next.  
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Figure 4.7 Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size A) data from October 21st, for various 
hydrants 
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Figure 4.8 Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size B) data from October 21st, for various hydrants 
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Figure 4.9  Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size C) data from October 21st, for various 
hydrants. 
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Figure 4.10 Feature graphs of ambient and leak (size D) data from October 21st, for various 
hydrants. 
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4.6 Training OCSVM and prediction 
The model used in this thesis is based on OCSVM which is based on Scikit-learn Python library. 
Though there are many leak detection methods such as artificial neural network (ANNs) (Mounce, S. R. et 
al., 2010, Aksela, K. et al., 2009, Romano, M. et al., 2011, Yang, J. et al., 2010) available, they need a 
significant amount of historical data for training. Previous studies employing leak detection performed on the 
same data sets showed that the semi-supervised OCSVM method provided good anomaly detection results 
(Cody, R. et al., 2018). OCSVM is a well-established anomaly detection algorithm (Scholkopf et al., 2001) 
which only requires training data from the baseline state of the system in order to determine if the new data 
belongs to the known baseline data class or if it is unknown. There are a number of kernels available to use 
with this algorithm such as linear, polynomial, sigmoidal and Gaussian radial basis functions (RBF). The 
linear kernel can classify very large leaks (from Figures 4.3 and 4.7) as the classes are clearly separable. 
However, to classify smaller leaks (of sizes B and C, where the classes show some overlapping as in Figures 
4.4, 4.5 and 4.9), RBF is more suitable as it can classify datasets which are non-linearly separable. Since RBF 
can classify more cases (sizes A, B, and C) compared to linear kernel (size A), RBF is selected as the kernel 
for OCSVM training. 
 
The algorithmic details of OCSVM are provided in Appendix B. The OCSVM algorithm is trained 
with only the ambient data on the test day. For example, to test the performance of OCSVM on the 
October 13th, ambient data from the October 13th is treated as the baseline data and used to train the 
OCSVM algorithm for various values of hyper parameters (the parameters for tuning the 
performance of the algorithm), gamma and nu. For the current OCSVM implementation, the 
parameter gamma takes 8 values on an equally spaced logarithmic scale ranging between -6 and 1 
(1e-06 to 10 on a linear scale). The parameter nu takes 10 values on an equally spaced linear scale 
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ranging between 0.01 and 0.99. Hence, for 80 combinations of gamma and nu, the OCSVM is trained 
(grid search) and for each model or for each combination of gamma and nu, the test set consisting of 
50% ambient case and 50% leak case of size A (in this case Oct 13th test data) is presented and the 
labels (+1 for ambient and -1 for Leak case) are predicted. These predicted labels along with the true 
labels (the expected labels of the test data) are used to check the performance of the trained model.  
 
Along with prediction accuracy (true positive), other metrics are used to demonstrate the 
performance of the OCSVM model. In order to take false negatives and false positives also into 
account along with true positives, the metrics Precision, Recall and F1 scores are calculated. The 
definitions for the aforementioned three scores, precision, recall and F1, are given next.  
 
Precision: This score is defined as the ratio of number of true positive labels to the sum of the number 
of true positives and false positive labels in the prediction result (given in the mathematical 
expression 3). This is calculated using the below mathematical expression 
Precision = tp / (tp +fp)                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                  (3) 
With respect to leak, tp here is number of leak cases that are predicted correctly and fp is the number 
of ambient cases that are predicted as leak cases. The precision score is a floating-point number 
which can take values between 0 and 1, 0 being the worst and 1 being the best. Intuitively, precision 
score is an indicator of the ability of the trained model (the classifier) not to label as positive, a 
sample that is negative. For example, if the precision score is high for the case of a leak, then the 
model is most likely to predict the case as leak.  
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Recall: This score is defined as the ratio of true positives to the total number of true positives and 
false negatives (given in the mathematical expression 4). With respect to a leak, this is the number 
of leak cases predicted correctly to the sum of number of leak cases predicted correctly and number 
of leak cases that are predicted as ambient cases. Intuitively, the recall score indicates the ability of 
the trained model to find all the positive samples (or the sample of interest, leak in this case). Recall 
score is a floating-point number which can take values between 0 and 1, 0 being the worst and 1 
being the best. 
 
Recall = tp / (tp +fn) 
                                                                                                                                                   (4) 
F1: This is the weighted average score of Precision and Recall, which is a floating point number 
which can take values between 0 and 1, 0 being the worst and 1 being the best. The relative 
contribution of precision and recall to F1 score is equal and is given by the mathematical expression 
5. 
 
F1 = 2 * (precision * recall) / (precision + recall) (5) 
Though the F1 score is often adequate to evaluate the performance of the trained model, Precision 
and Recall scores are also used to provide better insight into the model. These scores are calculated 
for both ambient and leak cases separately.                                                                                                                                                   
 
In the process of finding the best generic model which can correctly classify leak and ambient cases, 
the model which results in the best F1 score for size A leak is selected after the Precision score, 
Recall score and F1 scores are calculated for each combination of the hyper parameters (gamma and 
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nu). The model with the highest F1 score is then tested for sizes B, C and D leaks. From the results 
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, it can be seen that sizes A, B and C leaks (for both Leak 1 and 2) are predicted 
with high F1 scores as their features were clearly separable from the features associated with the 
ambient data (in Figure 4.3 through 4.5 and 4.7 through 4.9), whereas for size D leak case, the F1 
scores are relatively low as their features are not clearly separable in the feature space (in Figures 
4.6 and 4.10). The prediction results for Leak1 for the instrumented Hydrant 3 corresponding to the 
October 13th, 2018 test date shown in the Table 4.3 was obtained by training the OCSVM algorithm 
only with the ambient data corresponding to the October 13th for the instrumented Hydrant 3.  For 
the leak sizes A, B and C, the Recall scores are high, however the Precision scores are lower 
compared to the Recall scores. This means that most of the leak cases were identified as leaks (and 
a small number of leak cases were identified as ambient), and many ambient cases were identified 
as leaks.  
 The prediction results for Leak 1, for the October 21st test data, are shown in the Table 4.4. These 
results were obtained by training the OCSVM algorithm with the ambient data from the October 
13th, 19th, 20th test dates and a small portion of the ambient data from October 21st. It can be seen 
from the results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 that the F1 scores for sizes A, B and C are better compared to 
the results from the October 13th. Similarly, Table 4.5 shows that the prediction results can be 
improved when training data from previous days are also included to train the prediction model for 
the Leak2 case. These observations show that as more training data is made available, the prediction 
model becomes more generic and provides good prediction capability and so, the model needs to be 
updated frequently for achieving good prediction performance. However, the fine-tuning of the 
model and a detailed investigation into the factors governing leak detection performance is 
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considered beyond the scope of this thesis and these results are provided only for the sake of 
completeness of the IoT implementation, the latter being the main focus of this thesis.   
For 13th ambient train data, 13thambient test and leak test data 
  gamma =0.000001, nu =0.2278 
size of the leak precision score recall score F1 score overall accuracy 
A 0.79 1 0.88 0.87 
B 0.79 0.99 0.88 0.86 
C 0.78 0.96 0.86 0.85 
D 0.36 0.15 0.21 0.44 
 
Table 4.3 Accuracies of prediction using OCSVM for various leak sizes for Leak 1, Hydrant 3 for 
October 13th training and testing data. 
 
For 13th, 19th, 20th, 21st ambient train data, 21st ambient test and leak test data 
  gamma = 0.001, nu = 0.1189 
size of the leak precision score recall score F1 score overall accuracy 
A 0.98 1 0.99 0.99 
B 0.98 1 0.99 0.99 
C 0.98 1 0.99 0.99 
D 0.95 0.27 0.42 0.62 
 
Table 4.4 Accuracies of prediction using OCSVM for various leak sizes for Leak 1, Hydrant 3 for 
October 13th, 19th, 20th and 21st training data and October 21st testing data. 
 
19th, 20th, 21st ambient training, 21st ambient test and leak test 
  gamma = 0.000001, nu = 0.1189 
  precision score recall score F1 score overall accuracy 
A 0.9 1 0.95 0.95 
B 0.9 1 0.95 0.95 
C 0.9 1 0.95 0.94 
D 0.53 0.11 0.18 0.51 
 
Table 4.5 Accuracies of prediction using OCSVM for various leak sizes for Leak 2, Hydrant 5 for 
October 19th and 20th training and 21st October testing data 
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From the results in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, the overall accuracies (which is a combination of 
ambient and leak test case accuracies) match the corresponding F1-scores. Hence, overall accuracy 
can also be used to evaluate the performance of OCSVM. F1-score, precision score and recall score 
provide additional insight into the performance of the algorithm. 
 
4.7 Summary 
The following observations can be made based on the results of development and testing of the leak 
detection IoT framework using GCP. The cloud technology was successfully deployed in solving the 
challenge of storing and processing a large amount of data collected from the IoT edge devices 
(emulators). The cloud processing pipeline was able to perform prediction on both live data 
(simulated) and batch data. The protocol such as HTTP was necessary for the communication 
between different systems (data sources (emulators) and data processing system (GCP)) and to 
ensure interoperability. Reducing the raw data to features was necessary to reduce the processing 
and transmission cost. The selected features RMS and spectral peak when used together successfully 
identified very large (200 litres/minute outflow), large (100 litres/minute outflow) and medium (50 
litres/minute outflow) leaks. OCSVM algorithm with RBF kernel performed very well in identifying 
large and medium sized leaks. Recall and Precision scores provided valuable insight into the 
performance of prediction algorithm OCSVM and the sensitivity analysis showed that the distance 
of an instrumented hydrant from a leak plays an important in determining whether features extracted 
from the data collected from that hydrant show sensitivity towards leak. The closer the hydrants are 
to a leak, the better the sensitivity (towards that leak) exhibited by the features extracted from the 
hydrants’ data.  
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Chapter 5   Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
  5.1 Conclusions 
 
This thesis focuses on an IoT implementation using Google Cloud Platform (GCP) and provides a 
detailed design and implementation of the cloud framework that is scalable, secure and able to 
analyze both real time as well as batch data collected from IoT devices attached to water distribution 
network for leaks. The processing capabilities of the framework shows that the concept of cloud 
based IoT solution for leak detection in WDN is viable and can provide a powerful means for utilities 
to carry out intervention strategies in continuous monitoring settings. The main conclusions of this 
study along with the conclusions resulting from the implementation are described next. 
 
5.1.1 Overall framework performance 
In terms of the overall performance of the IoT based leak detection framework presented, the 
following main conclusions can be drawn: 
 
 The framework was able to process data from two different emulators running two different 
platforms (Hologram Cloud and a custom Python program running on windows OS), which 
shows that this framework supports data from multiple sources through HTTP protocol.  
 Feature extraction at the sensor node level allows for lower data transmission overhead and 
processing costs by reducing raw time-series data to only the pertinent information required 
for the machine learning algorithm. This could have significant implications for real-world 
implementation employing hundreds and possibly thousands of IoT sensors at a city scale.  
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 Security is ensured at each stage on GCP. For example, the data ingestion layer on GCP 
embeds two types of authentication such as API key authentication and OAuth2.0 
authentication. Similarly, on Cloud Storage, client-side encryption and server-side 
encryption ensures data security. In Cloud Dataflow pipeline communication with GCP 
sources and sinks are encrypted and the communication is carried over HTTPS while all inter-
worker communication is carried over a private network. 
 Though the framework used emulators to emulate live stream of acoustic pressure data 
coming from hydrophones attached to hydrants, the thesis did not employ synthetic data and 
the decision making sub-system of the framework was tuned using actual data. Also, the 
classification algorithm used in this thesis does not require all possible cases to set a baseline. 
Hence the framework can be confidently used to classify the data in a live WDN when 
emulators are replaced by the actual data collection sub system, without making any changes 
to the overall framework. 
 Since GCP is integrated with easy to use and powerful machine learning API (since it is 
integrated with Sci-kit learn and Tensorflow Python libraries), the task of data analysis was 
relatively straight-forward. 
 Auto-scaling infrastructure on GCP provided scalability at every stage of data life cycle (such 
as data ingestion, storage, processing and result visualization) without user intervention. 
 Since the GCP is based on distributed computing, it is fault tolerant and so are the data 
analysis and decision-making layers in the leak detection framework. 
 Decision support sub-system used a simple, yet powerful decision-making algorithm, 
OCSVM with Gaussian RBF kernel. The model used in this thesis was able to detect very 
large, large, and medium-sized leaks and ambient cases. However, a model which can classify 
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very small leaks remains to be developed. OCSVM was able to detect a majority of the leak 
types and ambient cases with minimal training (only with ambient labeled data). This is ideal 
for use in live WDNs, where it is extremely difficult to obtain labeled data for the leak cases 
whereas obtaining ambient data is relatively simple. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for future work 
 
This thesis presented an effective, scalable, and secure framework which can be deployed at scale to 
detect leaks in WDNs. This work is by no means exhaustive and there is still room for improvement 
in many areas. The following list summarizes some of the key areas for improvement. 
 While leak detection was demonstrated and the instrumented hydrant (from where the data 
was collected) that is close to the leak was identified, leak localization (the exact leak 
location) was not implemented, which could be a future task. 
 Live testing (in a live WDN) was not undertaken in this thesis, mainly due to the difficulty 
in finding industry partners. This framework could be deployed in an actual WDN and its 
performance could be evaluated in the future. 
 The framework can currently support data sources which rely on the HTTP protocol. The 
framework can be broadened to support other communication protocols such as MQTT and 
to support greater interoperability. 
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Appendix A 
 
Details of Implementation 
 
 
Introduction 
The details of implementation of emulators (Python client on Raspberry Pi, Hologram cloud, Python 
client on a laptop computer), Cloud Functions, Cloud Dataflow, Cloud ML, Cloud SDK, BigQuery 
and AI Platform Notebook are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Data acquisition layer 
The initial phase of data collection from WDN, data pre-processing and feature extraction were 
discussed in chapter 4. So only the implementation details of the rest of the IoT components are 
given here. 
Emulators 
Python client on Raspberry Pi 
Common IoT device, the Raspberry PI was also used in the implementation pipeline. Python 3.7 
along with the Hologram Python SDK was installed to enable communication between the Raspberry 
Pi and a USB cellular modem, Hologram Nova. The features calculated from the hydrophone data 
were sent in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format using hologram.sendMessage function 
syntax of the Hologram SDK as follows: 
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hologram.sendMessage("{“rms”: ”10.11”, ”spectral_peak”:”33.23”, ”label”:”-1”, 
“hydrant”:”h3”}")  
JSON is a language independent data format that is human readable and consists of data in key value 
pairs. In the above JSON message example, label 1 is associated with ambient data and -1 for leak 
data. Data is identified by its location, hydrant value, for example “h3” is the data captured 
from the field hydrant h3, which is located at the address, 30 Paulstown in Guelph, as described in 
Chapter 3. 
Hologram Cloud 
Hologram Cloud was configured to automatically transmit the data received from Raspberry Pi to 
the GCP Cloud Function by configuring a set of parameters for a webhook (an HTTP POST request 
provided in the form of web UI). The configuration included providing the right destination URL, 
I.e. GCP Cloud Function URL along with a device identification number of the Hologram modem, 
timestamp of receiving JSON data and the API key provided by GCP. They were separated by the 
symbol “&”. In the header section, x-auth-token was provided, which consisted of a base-64 encoded 
username and password for the Hologram cloud. The following sample explains the route 
configuration. 
Fields Subfields Values 
URL  https://us-central1-uw-cive-700-
1.cloudfunctions.net/Login?device=<<device_id>>&timestamp=<<received>> 
PAYLOAD  <<decdata>> 
HEADERS content-
type 
application/json 
 
 96 
 
x-auth-
token 
dGVzdC50ZXN0QHRlc3QuY29tOnRlczEyMzoi 
Apikey MIzaMyCugA9sAgpUhGVH0KtXbACPyHP8OPrpNLX 
Table 1 Route configuration for the webhook on hologram cloud 
The features received by Hologram from Raspberry Pi 3 is transmitted by HTTP POST request to 
GCP, which is explained in the next section. 
Python client on laptop 
The laptop used as a Python client runs Python 3.7 on a 64-bit, Windows 10 OS, which sends the 
data using HTTP POST requests to Cloud Functions. Emulators first send the authentication 
information to GCP and upon passing this authentication stage the features are transmitted to the 
GCP. The implementation of two types of authentication are discussed next. 
(i) API key authentication: A typical HTTP POST request with API key authentication looks 
like: 
res=requests.post(“https://us-central1-uw-cive-700-
1.cloudfunctions.net/Api_Key_Demo_ML?key=AIzaSyAvLhEDXnG2h8ES6He76eW8wkFyOm6jiq
E&device=156790&timestamp=31-07-2019T12:12:12”, json={"rms": "10.11", 
"spectral_peak": "33.23", "label": "-1", "hydrant" : "h3"}, headers={'X-Auth-
Token': base64.b64encode(bytes(combined_string, encoding='utf8'))}) 
The requests.post is a python function syntax to send an HTTP POST request consisting of a 
website address as the first argument which represents GCP Cloud Function, which is an ingestion 
component of the GCP. The URL also consists of an API key, device identification number, and 
timestamp corresponding to the time of request to the GCP. The second argument in the 
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requests.post is the data represented in JSON. The third argument of requests.post function 
syntax is the header which consists of the base64 encoded username and password.  
Base-64 is a binary-to-text encoding scheme where each digit represents 6-bits of data. If an ASCII 
(subset of UTF-8) string is represented by three 8-bit bytes total 24 bits), then the Base64 converted 
string contains four 6-bit data (total 24 bits). A simple example is shown in Table 2, where the string 
“Cat” is converted to “Q2F0” in Base64 encoding.  
Table 2 UTF-8 and base64 character encoding. 
(Note: UTF-8 is a type of encoding defined by Unicode which defines standards to maintain consistency in representing text in the 
computing industry around the world.) 
(ii) OAuth2.0 authentication: requests.post function syntax for OAuth2.0 authentication is 
of the format similar to that of API_Key request.post, except for the header section and a 
couple of other arguments such as Device Id and API_KEY as the requests.post is sent 
from emulator after the authentication process is completed. A typical requests.post for 
Oauth2.0 is as follows: 
 res=requests.post(“https://us-central1-uw-cive-700-
1.cloudfunctions.net/OAuth_Demo_ML?timestamp=31-07-2019T12:12:12”, json={"rms": 
"10.11", "spectral_peak": "33.23", "label": "-1", "hydrant" : "h3"}, headers={}) 
 
ASCII 
or 
UTF-8 
chara
cter 
C A T 
8-bit 67 (0x43) 97 (0x61) 116 (0x74) 
Bits 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Base64 6-bit 16 54 5 52 
Chara
cter 
Q 2 F 0 
 81(0x10) 50 (0x36) 70 (0x05) 48 (0x34) 
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Data analysis and decision-making layer 
To use the GCP subcomponents, the first step is to enable them on the GCP website. The coding 
details on various GCP components were based on the documentation provided by Google on 
GCP[8].  
Ingestion 
Cloud Function 
Cloud Function acts as the ingestion component for GCP, which is a web application written in Flask 
framework running Python code. Cloud Function in this thesis is customized to handle HTTP POST 
requests using the trigger type HTTP. To run the Python code, the library dependencies or the 
additional code needed were added in requirements.txt on Cloud Functions user interface(UI), as 
shown below: 
# Function dependencies, for example: 
# package>=version 
google-cloud 
google-cloud-pubsub 
 
requirements.txt file is a file containing a list of items to be installed by pip install (which is a package 
manager for Python) before the Python code is actually run on VM. The above code snippet shows 
that Google Cloud and Cloud Pub/Sub packages need to be installed on the virtual machine (VM) 
where the code is run on the cloud. So before the code is run the above mentioned packages are 
installed on the VM when the Cloud Function code is run on VM. 
For the API key case, environmental variables API_KEY, DEVICE_ID, X_AUTH_TOKEN were 
specified. API_KEY was used to check whether the POST request sent contained the correct key. 
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The DEVICE_ID was used to check whether the device identification numbers sent by the emulators 
are correct. For OAuth2.0 request, API key check and device identification check are not made, as 
the authentication check is made by the Google server only once and only if the client passes the 
authentication the HTTP request reaches Cloud Function. 
Once the HTTP client was authenticated, the JSON data was verified by checking whether all the 
key values such as rms, spectral_peak, label, hydrant were present along with checking for 
the presence of time stamp that is a part of the URL in the HTTP request. If all the checks passed, 
then an ‘200: okay’ response was sent back to the calling function, either the Python client (in case 
of laptop emulator) or to a Hologram application (in case of Raspberry Pi 3 emulator). If the checks 
failed, then corresponding error messages were sent back to the calling function. If all the checks 
were passed, before sending ‘200:ok’ response back to calling function, Cloud Function created a 
new JSON and converted it into a byte string (as Cloud Pub/Sub could take the data only in byte 
string format as shown below) for Cloud Pub/Sub to ingest the data. This new JSON consisted of all 
the key value pairs from the emulators along with the timestamp that was a part of the URL in the 
HTTP post request sent by emulators.  
b'{"rms":"10.11","spectral_peak":"33.23","label":"-
1","hydrant":"h3","date_time":"2019-06-30T00:21:28"}' 
The JSON that was forwarded to Cloud Pub/Sub or any error message sent back to calling function 
could all be seen in Cloud Function log files. 
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Storage 
Cloud Pub/Sub 
On Cloud Pub/Sub UI, a topic “hydrophone” was created prior to the first request from the 
Python/Hologram client. When the messages arrive at Pub/Sub, it can be viewed on Pub/Sub page 
on GCP website. When the Cloud DataFlow job (which is a subscriber to the topic “hydrophone”) 
was created, it appeared on the list of subscribers on Cloud Pub/Sub subscriber list.  
Cloud storage 
As mentioned previously, Cloud Storage serves as both permanent and temporary storage functions 
in the GCP. On the GCP web UI, a bucket was created to act as a container for both folders and files 
by specifying a project ID as the name. Subsection Cloud ML describes how the ambient and leak 
data cases were uploaded along with a model file, stored and then used to train the Cloud ML for 
predictions on stream and batch data. Similarly, a temporary folder was created on Cloud Storage 
and used to store the files generated during Cloud DataFlow execution. To create temporary storage, 
the storage location is provided as a command line parameter (as “--temp_location gs://uw-
cive-700-1/tmp/”) during the executing of Cloud DataFlow code. These files and folders are 
accessed by the programs by specifying the fully qualified name of that file or folder, as given by: 
gs://<bucket-name>/foldername1/foldername2/../filename. 
Data analysis 
Cloud Dataflow 
Cloud Dataflow constitutes the data analysis component in the overall GCP architecture. Two types 
of Cloud Dataflow pull subscribers are used in this thesis: 
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(i) Case 1: First pull subscriber calculates prediction on each data element of the stream and 
outputs the prediction to a BigQuery table.  
(ii) Case 2: The second subscriber maps the incoming JSON to an output table from which a 
Python script running on AI Platform Notebook selects a set of rows between time stamps 
specified and performs batch prediction on the selected data. 
Case 1: This Cloud Dataflow code was developed and tested initially on a local machine prior to its 
deployment on GCP. Since it was a user defined code, a service account was created so that the code 
could access other Google APIs such as Cloud Pub/Sub, BigQuery, Cloud Storage and Cloud ML. 
Service account is the identity that applications use for authentication with Google API, without 
embedding any keys or user credentials in the application code. The service account key file 
<service-account-filename.JSON> was obtained by creating a service account and providing the 
details such as the name of the service account, the level of permission. The environment variable 
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS was set to use the service account information in the code, by 
running the following command on the local command prompt:  
set GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS="<path to keyfile.JSON>”.  
Apache-beam framework required to run the Cloud Dataflow code was installed using the following 
command: 
<path of the python directory>python.exe –m pip install apache-beam[gcp] 
Before deploying the Cloud Dataflow code on GCP, the code was run on a local machine, using 
Python which ran on Python Integrated Development Environment (IDE) PyCharm 2018.3.5. In the 
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configuration section, provided the following command line parameters which were needed by the 
DataFlow program. 
--input_topic projects/uw-cive-700-1/topics/hydrophone --output_table "uw-cive-
700-1:demo3.test" --project uw-cive-700-1 --temp_location gs://uw-cive-700-
1/tmp/ --staging_location gs://uw-cive-700-1/staging/ --runner DataFlowRunner 
 
--input_topic:   fully qualified path of Cloud Pub/Sub topic 
--output_table:  fully qualified name of the BigQuery where the prediction result along  
                                   with other values are stored.  
--project:      project name 
--temp_location: location on the Cloud Storage where the intermediate files from cloud    
                                   dataflow execution are stored. 
--staging_location: Cloud Storage path for staging the binary file of the Cloud Dataflow code. 
                   
--runner:        DirectRunner/DataFlowRunner 
 
A fully qualified topic has the structure projects/<project-name>/topics/<topic_name>. The project 
name used in this thesis was uw-cive-700-1 and the topic name is hydrophone. A fully qualified table 
has the structure <project-name>:<dataset-name>.table-name. A project consists of one or more data 
sets, where the data set consists of one or more tables.  
Dataset-name and table names used were demo3 and test, respectively. So the fully qualified table 
name is uw-cive-700-1:demo3.test. temp_location was taken as gs://uw-cive-700-
1/tmp/, where tmp is a folder under the bucket uw-cive-700-1. While the bucket and project 
names can be different, in this thesis they were retained to be the same. Bucket storage class was 
regional and us-cental1-a was selected for the region and zone. A folder named staging under the 
bucket was used for staging the Cloud Dataflow code executable file. Streaming was enabled in the 
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Python code for Cloud Dataflow. The Cloud Dataflow code was executed on local machine with –
runner set to DirectRunner in the command line parameters. After it was run successfully, the 
same Cloud Dataflow code was run on local machine with runner set to DataFlowRunner in 
command line parameters. When the code was executed, a pipeline was created on the cloud. Each 
data element of the incoming stream was decoded to utf-8 and keys and values of JSON were 
extracted by the Cloud Dataflow code. Values of the keys RMS and spectral peak were presented to 
the machine learning module, which in turn calls the training module and returns the prediction 
results to Cloud Dataflow. JSON data containing results and corresponding features and label, was 
sent to Bigquery to add it to the table test. An example of JSON data sent is given below: 
{"rms":"10.11","spectral_peak":"33.23","label":"-1","hydrant":"h3",”result”:”-
1”,"date_time":"2019-06-30T00:21:28"} 
Case 2: For mapping input stream data to BigQuery output table, a readily available dataflow 
template provided by GCP was used. This type of job was created by selecting “Cloud Pub/Sub topic 
to BigQuery” option on the template list and providing all the necessary details such as fully qualified 
BigQuery table name, name of the Cloud Dataflow job, temporary Cloud Storage location, region, 
fully qualified Cloud Pub/Sub topic name as in Case 1. The template to create a Cloud Dataflow job 
using the GCP provided template is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Dataflow job creation template. 
When the job is running, it can be monitored used the job details shown in the Figure 2(a) and (b). 
Each operation on the data is represented by a rectangular box, which when highlighted as shown in 
Figure 2(a) provided the details such as how many data elements are processed and number of bytes 
processed. Similar pipeline appears for Case 1 as well when the job was deployed on to the GCP. 
Fig. 2(b) provides the overall job summary including Apache-beam version used, memory usage and 
CPU usage. Errors/any execution details at any stage of execution could be seen using Stackdriver 
logs. 
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Figure 2 (a). Dataflow job details for monitoring the DataFlow execution 
 
Figure 2 (b). Dataflow job details for monitoring the DataFlow execution. 
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Cloud ML 
Prior to deployment on the cloud, the following steps were taken so that Cloud ML is accessible by 
Cloud Dataflow to obtain the prediction results.  
(i) AI-Platform Notebook API was enabled. 
(ii) On the web UI, Cloud Shell, which is a command line interface (CLI) with Cloud SDK was 
used to run the commands in the following steps. 
(iii) gcloud package was updated by running the command gcloud components update. 
(iv) Scikit-learn and Pandas packages were installed by running the following command: 
i. pip install --user scikit-learn pandas 
(v) Following commands were run to set the environment variables: 
BUCKET_NAME="uw-cive-700-1" 
JOB_NAME="hydrant3_scikit_learn_20190624_115958" 
JOB_DIR=gs://$BUCKET_NAME/ 
MODEL="Hydrant3_train_sklearn" 
MODEL_NAME="Hydrant3_train_sklearn" 
MODEL_DIR="uw-cive-700-1/hydrant3_20190624_171650" 
TRAINING_PACKAGE_PATH="./hydrant3_sklearn_trainer/" 
MAIN_TRAINER_MODULE="hydrant3_sklearn_trainer.hydrant4_sklearn" 
REGION=us-central1 
PYTHON_VERSION=3.7 
SCALE_TIER=BASIC 
PROJECT_ID="uw-cive-700-1" 
FRAMEWORK="SCIKIT_LEARN" 
INPUT_FILE="input.json" 
TEXT_INSTANCES="text_file" 
VERSION_NAME="v1" 
RUNTIME_VERSION=1.13 
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(vi) echo command was run on each of the above set environment variables to determine if the 
variables show the values that were set.  
(vii) Hydrant3_sklearn.py file which trains the model was written under the folder 
hydrant3_sklearn_trainer. The training part of the code was tested on local machine 
before it was uploaded on to GCP. The program hydrant3_sklearn.py contains the code 
subprocess.check_call(['gsutil', 'cp', os.path.join(data_dir,'AmbHydr3'), 
'AmbHydr4'], stderr=sys.stdout) and subprocess.check_call(['gsutil', 'cp', 
os.path.join(data_dir,'LeakHydr3'), 'LeakHydr3'], stderr=sys.stdout) to 
upload the local training data file AmbHydr3 and LeakHydr3 on to Cloud Storage. The 
program reads the above mentioned files and trains the model.  
(viii) The following command was run and its success status was tracked on GCP 
console/webUI under AI-Platform Jobs section. This command exported the model to 
model.joblib file and stored it on Cloud Storage under the path uw-cive-700-
1/hydrant3_20190624_171650. 
gcloud ai-platform jobs submit training $JOB_NAME --job-dir $JOB_DIR --package-
path $TRAINING_PACKAGE_PATH --module-name $MAIN_TRAINER_MODULE --region $REGION 
--runtime-version=$RUNTIME_VERSION --python-version=$PYTHON_VERSION --scale-tier 
$SCALE_TIER 
AI-Platform organized the trained models and their versions. This was done by creating a model and 
its version and linking them to model.joblib.This model.joblib is used by Cloud Dataflow and 
AI Platform Notebook Python code for prediction. 
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Visualization of results 
BigQuery 
Big query acts as a permanent storage for data and data analysis results. It provides data for batch 
processing as well as for result visualization. It stores the data in the table format which can accessed 
using standard query language (SQL) queries. An example of a simple SQL query to retrieve all the 
rows of a table test that belongs to data set demo3 and project uw-cive-700-1, between current 
time and last 10 minutes is given below, 
select * from `uw-cive-700-1.demo3.test` WHERE ((DATETIME_DIFF(CURRENT_DATETIME, 
PARSE_DATETIME('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ',  date_time), MINUTE))) <= 10; 
AI Platform Notebook 
AI Platform Notebook provides an interactive environment that comes integrated with machine 
learning tools such as scikit-learn and tensorflow for writing python code to perform data analytics. 
In this thesis, AI Platform Notebook was used to execute both batch analytics and extracting stream 
processing results from BigQuery. To access BigQuery, its library was installed by adding a line!pip 
install --upgrade google-cloud-bigquery[pandas] at the top of the AI Platform Notebook 
instance. SQL query similar to the one mentioned in the previous section was used to retrieve table 
rows that contained the data that was used in batch processing and visualization of results.  
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Appendix B 
One Class Support Vector Machine  (OCSVM) 
OCSVM[9] is an unspervised outlier detection method. Different kernel methods can be specified 
for decision making. Various kernel methods available for OCSVM are linear, polynomial, radial 
basis function (RBF) and sigmoid. They differ in the way they map the training data point to higher 
dimensions to create hyperplane decision boundary between the classes of data set. The default 
kernel used for OCSVM is RBF Gaussian. This default setting is used in this thesis. RBF is a real 
valued function whose value depends only on the distance from some point c in the Euclidean space, 
so that h (x, c) = h (‖x - c‖). If c is the origin, c=0, and h (x) = h (‖x‖). Commonly used RBF is of the 
Gaussian form which is:  
                                                               
where, x is an observation or data to be evaluated. N is the number of Gaussian kernels which is 
usually equal to number of data points in the training dataset. xi is the centre of ith Gaussian curve of 
the function h(x). wi is the ith weight that decides influence of Gaussian curve with centre xi on x. 
Curve with higher weight has higher influence on x. x belongs to the curve with highest weight which 
in turn decides which class x belongs to. 𝛾(gamma) must be greater than 0. 𝛾 is inversely 
proportional to the width of Gaussian curve. Higher the value of 𝛾, narrower the curve is. This leads 
to poor generalization. So care needs to be taken to find a good 𝛾 that leads to good generalization. 
In this thesis, as Python is used in classifying the data, using ocsvm, the details of python 
OneClassSVM class, its variables, methods are given below. OneClassSVM is a class of sklearn.svm 
 110 
 
module. The following table provides various variables that belong to the class, their values and 
meanings.  
class sklearn.svm.OneClassSVM(kernel=’rbf’, degree=3, gamma=’auto_deprecated’, coef0=0.0, 
tol=0.001, nu=0.5, shrinking=True, cache_size=200, verbose=False, max_iter=-1, 
random_state=None) 
Type Name Value Meaning 
Parameters Kernel string, optional 
(default=’rbf’) 
Specifies the kernel type 
to be used in the 
algorithm. It must be one 
of ‘linear’, ‘poly’, ‘rbf’, 
‘sigmoid’, 
‘precomputed’ or a 
callable. If none is given, 
‘rbf’ will be used. If a 
callable is given it is used 
to precompute the kernel 
matrix. 
degree int, optional 
(default=3) 
Degree of the polynomial 
kernel function (‘poly’). 
Ignored by all other 
kernels. 
Gamma float, optional 
(default=’auto’) 
Kernel coefficient for 
‘rbf’, ‘poly’ and 
‘sigmoid’. Current 
default is ‘auto’ which 
uses 1 / n_features, if 
gamma='scale' is passed 
then it uses 1 / 
(n_features * X.var()) as 
value of gamma. The 
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current default of 
gamma, ‘auto’, will 
change to ‘scale’ in 
version 0.22. 
‘auto_deprecated’, a 
deprecated version of 
‘auto’ is used as a default 
indicating that no explicit 
value of gamma was 
passed. 
coef0 float, optional 
(default=0.0) 
Independent term in 
kernel function. It is only 
significant in ‘poly’ and 
‘sigmoid’. 
Tol float, optional Tolerance for stopping 
criterion. 
Nu float, optional An upper bound on the 
fraction of training errors 
and a lower bound of the 
fraction of support 
vectors. Should be in the 
interval (0, 1]. By default 
0.5 will be taken. 
Shrinking boolean, optional Whether to use the 
shrinking heuristic. 
cache_size float, optional Specify the size of the 
kernel cache (in MB). 
verbose bool, default: False Enable verbose output. 
Note that this setting 
takes advantage of a per-
process runtime setting in 
libsvm that, if enabled, 
may not work properly in 
a multithreaded context. 
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max_iter int, optional 
(default=-1) 
Hard limit on iterations 
within solver, or -1 for no 
limit. 
random_state int, RandomState 
instance or None, 
optional 
(default=None) 
Ignored. Deprecated 
since version 0.20: 
random_state has been 
deprecated in 0.20 and 
will be removed in 0.22. 
Attributes support_ support_ : array-
like, shape = 
[n_SV] 
Indices of support 
vectors. 
support_vectors_ support_vectors_ : 
array-like, shape = 
[nSV, n_features] 
Support vectors. 
dual_coef_ array, shape = [1, 
n_SV] 
Coefficients of the 
support vectors in the 
decision function. 
coef_ array, shape = [1, 
n_features] 
Weights assigned to the 
features (coefficients in 
the primal problem). This 
is only available in the 
case of a linear kernel. 
coef_ is readonly 
property derived from 
dual_coef_ and 
support_vectors_ 
Intercept_ array, shape = [1,] Constant in the decision 
function 
offset_ float Offset used to define the 
decision function from 
the raw scores. We have 
the relation: 
decision_function = 
score_samples - offset_. 
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The offset is the opposite 
of intercept_ and is 
provided for consistency 
with other outlier 
detection algorithms. 
The Following table provides the methods that belongs to OneClassSVM class, their input 
parameters, return values and the meaning of the method. 
 
Method Name Parameters Return values Meaning of the methods 
decision_function (self, X) X:array-like, shape 
(n_samples, 
n_features) 
dec: array-like, 
shape 
(n_samples,) 
Signed distance to the 
separating hyperplane. 
Returns the decision function 
of the samples. 
fit(self, X, y=None, 
sample_weight=None, 
**params) 
X: {array-like, sparse 
matrix}, shape 
(n_samples, 
n_features) 
Set of samples, where 
n_samples is the 
number of samples and 
n_features is the 
number of features. 
self : object Detects the soft boundary of 
the set of samples X. If X is 
not C-ordered contiguous 
array it is copied. 
sample_weight: array-
like, shape 
(n_samples,) 
Per-sample weights. 
Rescale C per sample. 
Higher weights force 
the classifier to put 
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more emphasis on these 
points. 
y: Ignored, not used, 
present for API 
consistency by 
convention. 
fit_predict (self, X[, y]) X: ndarray, shape 
(n_samples, 
n_features)Input data. 
y: ndarray, 
shape 
(n_samples,) 
1 for inliers, -1 
for outliers. 
Performs fit on X and returns 
labels for X. Returns -1 for 
outliers and 1 for inliers. 
y:Ignorednot used, 
present for API 
consistency by 
convention. 
get_params (self[, deep]) deep: boolean, optional 
If True, will return the 
parameters for this 
estimator and contained 
sub-objects that are 
estimators. 
params: 
mapping of 
string to any 
Parameter 
names mapped 
to their values. 
Get parameters for this 
estimator. 
predict (self, X) X: {array-like, sparse 
matrix}, shape 
(n_samples, 
n_features) 
For 
kernel=”precomputed”, 
the expected shape of X 
is [n_samples_test, 
n_samples_train] 
y_pred: array, 
shape 
(n_samples,) 
Class labels for 
samples in X. 
Perform classification on 
samples in X. For a one-class 
model, +1 or -1 is returned. 
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score_sample (self, X) X : array-like, shape 
(n_samples, 
n_features) 
score_samples: 
array-like, 
shape 
(n_samples,) 
Returns the 
(unshifted) 
scoring 
function of the 
samples. 
Raw scoring function of the 
samples. 
set_params (self, 
\*\*params) 
  self Set the parameters of this 
estimator. The method works 
on simple estimators as well 
as on nested objects (such as 
pipelines). The latter have 
parameters of the form 
<component>__<parameter> 
so that it’s possible to update 
each component of a nested 
object. 
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Appendix C 
Chapter 6  
Glossary 
Chapter 7  
API: It is a set of subroutine definitions to communicate between different components of a system. 
Containers: These are isolated user space instances that look like real computers from the view point 
of programs running on them but they are virtual environments provided by an operating system. A 
real computer can see all the devices connected to it however, a container can see only the devices 
assigned to it by the operating system.  
Distributed computers: These computers are located on different networks but can communicate 
and co-ordinate their actions by passing messages to one another. They interact with one another to 
achieve a common goal. Significant characteristics of distributed system are concurrency of 
computers, lack of a global clock, independent failure of computers or components. 
Kernel Methods: In machine learning, kernel methods are a class of algorithms for pattern analysis. 
The general task of pattern analysis is to find and study general types of relations (for example 
clusters, rankings, principal components, correlations, classifications) in datasets. In case of 
classification, kernels map data points to higher dimensional space via some transformation and 
linearly separable data points are found that helps to find hyperplane decision boundary that can 
classify the data into different classes. 
Machine Learning: Machine learning (ML) is a subset of Artificial Intelligence and is a scientific study of 
algorithms and statistical models that are based on sample data, known as "training data", in order to make 
predictions or decisions without being explicitly programmed to perform the task. 
Micromachines: Micromachines are the mechanical objects generally between 100 nanometres too 
100 micrometers in size and are fabricated in the same way as integrated circuits. 
Semi-supervised Learning: It is a machine learning task of learning a function from combination 
of (usually a small amount of) labelled and (a large amount of) unlabelled datasets. When it is not 
possible to get fully labelled datasets, semi-supervised learning is used. 
SPI protocol: It is a synchronous serial communication interface specification used for short 
distance communication in embedded systems. 
Supervised Learning: Supervised learning is the machine learning task of learning a function from 
labelled training data consisting of a set of training examples. In supervised learning, each example 
is a pair consisting of an input object or vector consisting of features and a desired output value. A 
supervised learning algorithm analyzes the training data and produces an inferred function, which 
can be used for mapping new examples.  
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Unsupervised Learning: It is a machine learning task of learning a function from unlabelled data. 
It usually involves grouping of data sets that are not labelled based on commonalities in the data and 
reacts to new data set based on the presence or absence of those commonalities. 
Virtual machine: It is an emulation of a computer system, i.e., it is based on computer architecture 
and provides functionality of a physical computer. Both hardware and software are involved in 
virtual machine implementation. 
Webhook: It is a way in which one web application provides information to other web application 
in real time. Data is sent in JSON format by webhooks. Webhooks use HTTP POST request to 
communicate. 
Interoperability: The ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and 
to use the information that has been exchanged 
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Hardware Datasheets 
 
 
 
Teensy 3.6 Pinouts 
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Hydrophone, SQ26-13 DataSheet 
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Raspberry Pi 3 Pinouts 
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System Block Diagrams 
Block diagram of the Nova board: 
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Input/Output Characteristics 
 
 
USB 
 
The Hologram Nova is designed to provide easy access to the u-blox SARA-U201 and 
SARA-R410-02B USB interface. 
 
SARA series modules include a high-speed USB 2.0 compliant interface with maximum 
480 Mb/s data rate. The module itself acts as a USB device and can be connected to any 
USB host. The USB is the suitable interface for transferring high speed data between 
SARA-U2 series and a host processor, available for AT commands. 
 
The USB_D+ / USB_D- lines carry the USB serial data and signaling. The USB interface is 
automatically enabled by an external valid USB VBUS supply voltage (5.0 V typical) 
applied on the VUSB_DET pin. 
 
For additional details, please see the following datasheets: 
u-blox SARA-U201 datasheet 
u-b lox SARA-R4 Series datasheet 
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UART 
 
At Hologram, we believe in providing an open platform for developers to build hardware. 
To support this mission, the Nova exposes the u-blox modem's UART interface as 
solderable pads on the top half of the board. For more advanced hardware devlopment, 
this provides direct access to the u-blox modem which runs at 1.8V 
 
Note: USE UART PADS AT YOUR OWN RISK. Pads are directly connected to the u-blox 
modem so using these I/O or improperly handling the board runs the risk of damaging 
the u-blox modem. Additionally, we do not officially provide support this interface. 
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Technical Specifications 
 
 
Absolute Maximum Ratings (Power Inputs) 
 
Stressing the device above one or more of the ratings listed in the Absolute Maximum 
Rating section may cause permanent damage. These are stress ratings only. Operating 
the device at these or at any conditions other than those specified in the Operating 
Conditions should be avoided. Exposure to Absolute Maximum Rating conditions for 
extended periods may affect device reliability. 
 
Symbol Description Min. Max. Unit 
VCC, USB 5V Input DC voltage at VCC pins -0.30 5.50 V 
USB D+/D- line Input DC voltage at USB_D+/D- pins -1.00 5.35 V 
UBLOX_RTS 
UBLOX_CTS 
UBLOX_TXD 
UBLOX_RXD 
Input DC voltage at u-blox digital interface 
pins 
-0.30 3.60 V 
UBLOX_RESET_N Input DC voltage at u-blox RESET_N pin -0.15 2.10 V 
GPIO2 
GPIO3 
GPIO4 
Input DC voltage at u-blox GPIO pins -0.30 3.60 V 
 
For power draw characteristics under certain cellular conditions, please view respective 
u-blox datasheets. 
 
Operating Conditions 
 
The Hologram Nova is designed to operate within temperatures between -45°C to 85°C. 
It is not designed to withstand material contact with moisture or any other conductors, 
aside from intended use of the USB. The Hologram Nova may be installed into 
appropriate enclosures that can protect the device from heat, cold, moisture, and 
humidity for Industrial use. 
 
 
If handling the Nova circuit board directly, please do so in an ESD-safe environment and 
wear ESD protection. 
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Radio Specifications 
 
The Hologram Nova platform features cellular modems which support a global list of 2G, 
3G, and LTE Cat-M1/NB-IoT frequencies. 
 
Nova 3G/2G (SARA-U201) 
 
 3G Bands: 
o Americas: Band 5 (850MHz), Band 2 (1900MHz) 
o Europe/Asia/Africa: Band 8 (900MHz), Band 1 (2100MHz) 
 2G Bands 
o GSM - 850MHz 
o E-GSM - 900MHz 
o DCS - 1800 MHz 
o PCS - 1900 MHz 
 
Nova LTE-M & NB-IoT (SARA-R410M-02B) 
 
 LTE Cat-M1/N1 Bands: 
o LTE FDD: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28 
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Mechanical Dimensions 
 
The Hologram Nova board without an enclosure is: 
 
 Length: 61.58 millimeters 
 Width: 19.4 millimeters 
 Height: 5.84 millimeters (maximum height) Below 
are views of the Hologram from the top and side. Top View: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Side View: 
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LEDs 
 
The Nova has two clear LEDs for providing power and connectivity feedback. A power 
LED that represents whether the modem is on or off, and a network LED that indicates 
the current network status. 
 
Note: Nova LTE-M & NB-IoT modem and Nova 3G/2G modem have same placement of 
LED color indicators but opposite use for power/network indication. Please use below 
table for reference. 
 
 
 
MODEL 
 
 
POWER LED 
 
 
NETWORK LED 
Nova 3G/2G Red Blue 
Nova LTE-M & NB-IoT Blue Red 
 
 Power LED status indicator (Red – 3G/2G, Blue – LTE-M & NB-IoT) 
o On: USB 5V is connected and the Nova is powered on 
o Off: USB 5V is not connected and the Nova is not powered on (modem may take 
up to 30s to boot up and power the LED) 
 Network LED status indicator (Blue – 3G/2G, Red – LTE-M & NB-IoT) 
o On, solid: Nova connected in active data session 
o On, rapid blink: 3G network detected (3G/2G Nova Only) 
o On, double blink: 2G network detected (3G/2G Nova Only) 
o Off: No network detected 
 Make sure antenna is securely connected, positioned to receive cell signal 
and SIM properly inserted 
 Device can take up to 200s to detect available networks 
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Antennas 
 
The Nova is made for ultimate flexibility and this extends to available antennas. Each 
model’s included antenna characteristics are listed below: 
 
Nova 3G/2G (SARA-U201) 
 
 Black, flexible antenna (Sinbon A9702472) 
o Size: 37x7x1mm 
o Weight: <1g 
o Connector: U.FL 
o Mounting: Adhesive 3M tape 
o Temperature: -40C - +85C 
 
Nova LTE-M & NB-IoT (SARA-R410) 
 
 Black, flexible antenna (Pulse PN W3907B0100) 
o Size: 111.70x20.4x1mm 
o Weight: <1g 
o Connector: U.FL 
o Mounting: Adhesive 3M tape 
o Temperature: -40C - +85C 
 
The Nova can also be used with additional antennas. If you'd like to use the Nova with an 
antenna which has an SMA connector, you need to purchase a UFL - SMA adapter. 
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Bill of Materials 
 
 
 
DESIGNATOR 
 
 
QUANTITY 
 
 
MFG 
 
 
MPN 
ANT_UFL 1 Amphenol A-1JB 
C2, C6, C48 3 MURATA GRM155R61C104KA88D 
C11 1 SAMSUNG CL10A225MQ8NNNC 
C39 1 MURATA GRM155R71C103KA01D 
C34 1 Murata GRM188R60J106ME84D 
C46 1 AVX/ELCO 04025A150JAT2A 
C36, C37, C38 3 MURATA GRM188R60J226MEA0D 
C41, C42, C43, 
C44, C45 (U201 
Nova Only) 
5 AVX 04025A470JAT2A 
C40 1 KEMET C0402C560J5GACTU 
C47, C49, C50 3 AVX F950J337MBAAQ2 
L7 1 Murata BLM18KG121TN1D 
L5 1 Coilcraft XFL4020-102MEC 
D1 1 VISHAY VLMB1500-GS08 
D2 1 VISHAY VLMS1500-GS08 
D3, D4, D5 3 Littlefuse PESD0402-140 
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DESIGNATOR 
 
 
QUANTITY 
 
 
MFG 
 
 
MPN 
L1 1 YAEGO RC0603JR-070RL 
R13 1 YAEGO RC0402FR-071ML 
R3, R5 2 YAEGO RC0402FR-073KL 
R4, R6, R7, R8 4 YAEGO RC0402JR-0710KL 
R1, R2 2 YAEGO RC0402FR-0722RL 
R11, R51 2 PANASONIC ERJ-2GEJ104X 
R12 1 YAEGO RC0402FR-07150KL 
R9 1 PANASONIC ERJ-2GEJ471X 
U16 1 U-BLOX SARA-U260-00S 
SIM1 1 GLOBAL CONNECTOR 
TECHNOLOGY 
SIM8050-6-0-14-01-A 
U2 1 TI TPS63020DSJ 
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 4 ON Semiconductor MMBT3904LT1G 
J1 1 MOLEX 480372200 
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Regulatory information 
Carrier Specific Certifications 
 
NOVA-U201 (3G/2G): AT&T, T-Mobile, PTCRB, GCF 
NOVA-R410 (LTE-M & NB-IoT): Verizon ODI, AT&T, T-Mobile (In progress), 
PTCRB, GCF 
 
Verizon Open Development Device #7721 
AT&T Network Compatibility Record: 10bkv4QCDm 
 
Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 
 
ECCNs are five character alpha-numeric designations used on the Commerce Control 
List (CCL) to identify dual-use items for export control purposes. An ECCN categorizes 
items based on the nature of the product, i.e. type of commodity, software, or 
technology and its respective technical parameters. 
 
ECCN for All Nova Modems: 5A992.c 
 
RoHS Compliance 
 
The Nova modem family complies with the RoHS (Restriction of Hazardous 
Substances) directive of the European Union, EU Directive 2011/65/EU. 
 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule Code (HTS) 
HTS Code for All Nova Modems: 8517.62.0010 
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Interference Statement 
 
This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC Rules and Industry Canada licence-
exempt RSS standards. Operation is subject to the following two conditions: (1) 
This device may not cause harmful interferences, and (2) this device must accept any 
interference received, including interference that may cause undesired operation. 
FCC & IC Compliance 
 
If the modem’s antenna is located farther than 20cm from the human body and 
there are no proximate transmitters, the FCC/IC approvals of the constituent u- blox 
SARA-U201 or SARA-R410-02B can be reused by the end product. 
 
Should the modems antenna be mounted closer than 20cm from the human body or 
if there are proximate transmitters, additional FCC/IC testing may be required for the 
end product. 
 
Nova 3G/2G & Nova LTE-M & NB-IoT modems make use of the underlying u-
blox module’s FCC & IC identification numbers below. 
 
 
 
MODEL 
 
 
FCC ID 
 
 
IC ID (CERTIFICATION NUMBER) 
Nova 3G/2G XPY1CGM5NNN 8595A-1CGM5NNN 
Nova LTE-M & NB-IoT XPY2AGQN4NNN 8595A-2AGQN4NNN 
 
Additionally, all Nova modems are compliant with FCC Part 15 Class B 
 15 
 
 
Modification Statement 
Hologram has not approved any changes or modifications to this device by the 
user. Any changes or modifications could void the user’s authorization 
to operate the equipment. 
End Product Labeling Requirements 
 
End products utilizing Nova 3G/2G modems should be labeled with the 
following information: 
 
Device Uses Approved Radio: NOVA-U201 
Contains FCC ID: 
XPY2AGQN4NNN Contains 
IC: 8595A-1CGM5NNN 
 
This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC Rules and Industry Canada 
licence-exempt RSS standards. Operation is subject to the following two 
conditions: (1) This device may not cause harmful interferences, and (2) 
this device must accept any interference received, including interference 
that may cause undesired operation. 
 
End products utilizing Nova LTE-M &NB-IoT modems should be labeled with the 
following information: 
 
Device Uses Approved Radio: NOVA-R410 
Contains FCC ID: 
XPY2AGQN4NNN Contains 
IC: 8595A-2AGQN4NNN 
 
This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC Rules and Industry Canada 
licence-exempt RSS standards. Operation is subject to the following two 
conditions: (1) This device may not cause harmful interferences, and (2) 
this device must accept any interference received, including interference 
that may cause undesired operation 
